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There is a growing, inescapable sense that something 
has gone terribly wrong with the patent system. Though it was 
founded with the laudable constitutional goal of 
“promot[ing] . . . [p]rogress” in the “useful [a]rts . . . ,” today, it 
is hard to find any positive news suggesting progress.1 Current 
patent lawsuits are widely described as a “battle”2 or a “war.”3 
And though litigators often use such allusions,4 this time the 
scale and the feel is different. During the past decade we 
witnessed an escalating intellectual property cold war where 
huge sums spiraled into a rapidly growing patent-industrial 
complex. Companies “stockpil[ed]”5 patents in huge numbers, 
  
 † Associate Professor, Cornell Law School. I would like to thank T.J. Chiang, 
Kevin Collins, John Duffy, Michael Frakes, Glynn Lunney Jr., Robert Merges, Michael 
Meurer, Bhaven Sampat, Josh Sarnoff, Henry Smith, and Geertrui Van Overwalle for 
helpful discussions and encouragement. This article has benefited from presentation at 
the 2012 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at Stanford Law School. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 2 Steve Lohr, Apple-Samsung Battle Shifts to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 
2012, at B1 (describing how Apple “assembled an ‘Android war room,’ where its 
employees can study Android products”). 
 3 Laura Sydell, Samsung Fight Among Many in Apple’s Patent War, NPR 
(July 30, 2012, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/30/157571532/samsung-fight-
among-many-in-apples-patent-war. 
 4 See Matthew D. Powers et al., The Successful Patent Litigator Must Learn 
the Way of Strategy: The Opportunities and Risks of Claim Construction, in F. SCOTT 
KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 874-76 (4th ed. 2008) 
(citing both a samurai strategy book as well as Sun Tzu’s THE ART OF WAR, and stating 
“litigation is a form of warfare”). Note that one of the authors, Matthew D. Powers, is 
one of the most respected patent litigators, who left his position at Weil, Gotschall, & 
Manges and is now representing nonpracticing entities. See Ashby Jones, When 
Lawyers Become “Trolls,” WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2012, at B1. 
 5 Andy Baio, A Patent Lie: How Yahoo Weaponized My Work, WIRED (Mar. 
13, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/03/opinion-baio-yahoo-patent-
lie/ (“Yahoo assured [its programmers] that their patent portfolio was a precautionary 
measure, to defend against patent trolls and others who might try to attack Yahoo with 
their own holdings. It was a cold war, stockpiling patents instead of nuclear arms, and 
every company in the valley had a bunker full of them.”). 
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not because those patents brought with them useful 
technology, but rather because they granted the patent holders 
devastating rights of exclusion.6 Patents, like some legal strain 
of anthrax, have been “weaponized.”7 With those stockpiles, 
patent holders have gone “thermonuclear”8 on their rivals.9 In 
the tech world, we are witnessing “World War III.”10 The patent 
threat even extends beyond the industrial superpowers, as 
patents from failed start-ups are compared to “loose nukes” 
that are finding their way into the hands of patent trolls intent 
on patent “terrorism.”11 Though someone might be left standing 
at the end, the rest of us cannot imagine how the resulting 
economic fallout counts as the “progress” promised and 
demanded by the Constitution. From Silicon Valley engineers, 
to economists, to legal scholars, and now to judges, the patent 
system is thought to be “in crisis,”12 “broken,”13 a “failure,”14 “an 
unnecessary evil,”15 and “dysfunctional.”16 So what has 
happened? Who is to blame?  
  
 6 Susan Decker & Brian Womack, Google Buys 1,023 IBM Patents to Bolster 
Defense of Android, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-09-14/google-purchases-1-023-patents-from-ibm-to-bolster-portfolio.html 
(describing how Google acquired “17,000 [patents] with its $12.5 billion acquisition of 
Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc.”). 
 7 Baio, supra note 5.  
 8 Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Could Steve Jobs Actually Win His Thermonuclear 
War?, CNN (June 30, 2012, 6:53 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/30/could-
steve-jobs-actually-win-his-thermonuclear-war/ (describing how Steve Jobs told his 
biographer that “‘Google has ‘f***ing ripped off the iPhone’ . . . , promising to go 
‘thermonuclear’ to destroy Android”). 
 9 See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple v. Samsung: The Patent Trial of the 
Century Starts Today, CNN (July 30, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/ 
2012/07/30/apple-v-samsung-the-patent-trial-of-the-century-starts-today/.  
 10 Sydell, supra note 3. As Albert Einstein famously stated, “I do not know 
how the Third World War will be fought, but I can tell you what they will use in the 
Fourth—rocks!” See THE NEW QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 173 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2005). 
 11 John Brandon, Fark.com Founder Links Patent Trolls with “Terrorists,” 
FOX NEWS (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/04/18/farkcom-wins-
patent-dispute-by-not-negotiating-with-terrorists/ (“[P]atent troll [was described as] a 
company established . . . solely to make cash through patent lawsuits . . . . Drew Curtis, the 
founder of Fark.com, calls them terrorists to be avoided at all costs. ‘It boils down to one thing: 
don’t negotiate with terrorists,’ Curtis said during a talk at the TED 2012 conference.”). 
 12 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3 (2009). 
 13 See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1-24 (2004). 
 14 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 45 (2008).  
 15 MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 7 (2008). 
 16 Richard A. Posner, Capitalism, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 3, 2012), 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/06/capitalismposner.html (“The institutional 
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Some blame the patent system, calling for it to be 
dismantled.17 Some blame patent trolls for their overly 
aggressive patent assertion practices. Some blame the Patent 
and Trademark Office for its shoddy quality control. Some 
blame the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for its 
overzealous support of patent holders. Yet I am not sure we can 
so easily place blame on any one group. Despite the widespread 
discontent, we cannot prove that something is actually amiss. 
As far as current patent theory goes, we aren’t sure anything 
has gone wrong, but the theory is so indeterminate that we also 
aren’t sure anything has gone right either.  
The embarrassing fact of the matter is that although 
the current theory of patents has been around for roughly the 
past two hundred years, it has never been able to justify the 
patent system as it exists. The patent system is explained as a 
general program for encouraging technological progress. By 
granting valuable rights of exclusion to patent holders, the 
system aims to divert rents to patent holders so as to induce 
the socially optimum level of technological advances. Though 
this underlying purpose is simple to state, it has created an 
intractable cost–benefit analysis that resists either justification 
or, alternatively, falsification.  
Once framed as inducing behavior through artificial 
incentives, we know there are benefits, and we know there are 
costs—but we don’t have reliable tools to quantify them. As a 
result, we cannot prove that the patent system is or is not 
socially beneficial. The result is patent policy that is based on 
“guesswork”18 as patent proponents and critics are buoyed by 
“faith” alone.19 The indeterminacy has produced two hundred 
years of “patent controversy.”20 Sixty years ago, Learned Hand 
lamented that the patent debate is “approach[ed] . . . with 
  
structure of the United States is under stress . . . . We have a . . . dysfunctional patent 
system . . . . Our capitalist system needs a lot of work to achieve proper capitalist goals.”). 
 17 See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 15, at 12. 
 18 American Patent System: Hearing on S. Res. 92 Before the Subcomm. on 
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 116, 
120 (1959) (statement of Judge Learned Hand) [hereinafter Hand on Patent Reform].  
 19 See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 253 (1996) (describing support for the 
“current system” as “an article of religious faith”); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra 
note 14, at 74 (quoting James Boyle as grounding IP policy not on empirical evidence 
but instead on “‘faith-based’ reasoning”). 
 20 Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth 
Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1-2 (1950) (“[T]he controversy about the patent of invention 
is very old . . . .”). 
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enormous passion but without enlightenment.”21 One side 
argues that the system is essential for “American industry,” 
while the other side calls the system “a beastly method.”22 “No 
one really knows. Each side is beating the air.”23 A great deal of 
research has been directed at the patent system,24 yet the 
underlying intractability remains.  
Is there really no terra firma within this “slough of 
despond”?25 Is there no core, no matter how small, around 
which consensus could begin to build? This article argues that 
the current patent dysfunction is not the fault of any one group, 
but rather that the fault lies with patent theory and the way it 
has framed the patent debate. Not only does patent theory’s 
intractable analysis preclude acceptance (or falsification), but it 
also provides no direction for patent reform. As will be argued 
below, the problem is that the theory has asked too much from 
the system. A more narrowly focused theory can provide needed 
solid ground on which to build a patent system.  
In particular, current patent theory assumes that 
patents are designed to directly create incentives that will 
induce the optimum amount of inventive activity. In other 
words, the system grants, to inventors, fairly absolute rights of 
exclusion of some predesigned breadth and length. To justify 
and evaluate that system, patent theorists then enumerate all 
the behaviors that these rights induce. In essence they are 
identifying all the ways in which patent holders can monetize 
these exclusive rights. The empirical case for that incentive-
based system then amounts to accounting for the costs and 
benefits of all these enumerated behaviors. Not only do we 
hope that the benefits outweigh the costs but we also hope that 
we can maximize the benefits minus the costs. This grand 
accounting has proven to be intractable and its optimization is 
even more so.  
To establish patent theory’s more solid grounding, this 
article departs from the standard incentive-creating narrative 
where patents are seen as directly creating incentives. Rather 
than starting with absolute rights and then listing induced 
behaviors, this article begins by identifying specific socially 
beneficial behavior and then determining the exclusive rights 
  
 21 Hand on Patent Reform, supra note 18, at 116. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1035 & n.8 (2005). 
 25 John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 525 (2010). 
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(no longer necessarily absolute) needed as instrumental support 
for that beneficial behavior. In particular, this article identifies 
private decision-making in the creation and market distribution 
of inventions (rather than information or technology) as socially 
beneficial behavior. It then identifies the minimal patent system 
necessary to support, but not directly incentivize, those 
particular activities. That exclusion provided by the patent 
system is the instrumental means to serve the higher purpose of 
getting inventions from their creators to potential users. 
Exclusion, then, is not aimed at creating incentives per se, but 
rather at preventing particular third-party acts that would 
disrupt (that is, harm) the social benefits of creating and 
distributing inventions. The result is an island, certainly a small 
one, of justifiable activity and patent exclusion. In other words, 
patent holders who undertake the hard, but socially beneficial, 
tasks of creating and disseminating inventions deserve the 
protection of the patent system and, in particular, deserve 
protection from third party acts that harm that socially 
beneficial activity. And though controversy may well continue 
to hound the patent system, this article argues that, no matter 
what reforms are proposed, those that are diligently marketing 
and disseminating their patented inventions should receive 
robust protection from the patent system.  
Though real progress establishing even such a limited 
island of justified patent activity is welcome, the specifics of 
this proposal may be greeted with suspicion, as it surely raises 
an important and obvious challenge. Even if agreeing with the 
need for a new patent theory, many will doubt that a 
straightforward voluntary market exchange of inventions could 
provide a workable patent narrative. After all, such a market is 
quite familiar from the tangible free market: if it could be done, 
why hasn’t it been done before? Indeed, the conventional view 
is that such a market narrative is doomed to fail when applied 
to public goods, such as technology. Technological information 
is thought to be too different from the well-understood world of 
tangible goods and, as a result, it is generally thought that a 
market model is not suitable for the patent system. 
In fact, highly influential economic thinking has 
regarded such a market for technology to be ill-advised. The 
work of two of the twentieth century’s greatest economists 
appears to argue against such a market. In economist Kenneth 
Arrow’s influential paper, he argued that a market would be 
1340 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
unable to achieve an optimal allocation of resources for 
inventions.26 Since its publication in 1962, that paper has 
formed one of the core objections to a strictly market-based 
solution for innovation.27 
In addition, Paul Samuelson’s work on public goods, in 
which he describes what has become known as the “Samuelson 
condition,” also stands as an obstacle.28 After deriving a top-
level condition for the optimal allocation of resources toward 
creating public goods like technology,29 Samuelson addressed 
whether private decision-making could ever lead to that optimal 
allocation of resources. He concluded that it could not30: 
consumers for the public good would systematically 
underrepresent their valuation of the public good and this would 
then prevent the optimal allocation of resources toward creating 
public goods.31 Arrow and Samuelson’s arguments are largely 
accepted as correct, standing as truly formidable obstacles to a 
market-based theory of patents. 
This article argues that Arrow and Samuelson were 
generally correct, but that they did not consider certain 
specific, exceptional cases that could provide a stable core for 
the current patent system. Those exceptional cases have 
remained unexplored because we have generally thought their 
scope too narrow. In a sense we have been asking the patent 
system to do too much. We have assumed that the patent 
system must be some universal technological information 
generation machine. With that broad purpose then, the above-
mentioned economic worries do indeed rightfully block a 
market-driven narrative for the patent system and we are 
likely stuck with our current indeterminate narrative. Yet 
what if we asked for less? What if we aimed for a more 
manageable objective? This article argues that the patent 
system should not focus on technological information 
generation generally; instead, it should focus on something 
  
 26 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619 (1962), available at http://www.nber.org/books/univ62-1.  
 27 Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual 
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 228-29 (2012). 
 28 RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, 
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 23 (2d ed. 1996). 
 29 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 387, 387-88 (1954). 
 30 Id. at 388. 
 31 Id. at 388-89. 
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narrower and more concrete: the creation and dissemination of 
inventions.  
In earlier research, I have focused on the invention in 
patent law as a doctrinal and conceptual matter.32 I have 
argued that the invention is an important substantive concept 
that is currently under-utilized and under-theorized.33 My 
work, along with others, has shown that we can solve a number 
of pressing doctrinal problems by using a substantive vision of 
the invention in patent law.34 This article adds to that work by 
emphasizing the invention’s fundamental role in directing the 
patent system to focus only on those technological artifacts that 
can be exchanged in an open market. It will show that 
inventions are in fact exceptions to the more general arguments 
of Arrow and Samuelson. 
Though general technological information may be ill-
suited for market commodification, this article will show that 
inventions are exceptional—they can be commodified. 
Inventions are completed solutions to relevant technological 
problems wherein that solution is refined enough that it is 
ready to be practiced by “any” person of skill in the art.35 In 
economic terms, an invention can be thought of as a production 
plan,36 a package of technological information that can 
effectively interface with neoclassical firms via the existing 
price system. By solving a relevant technological problem and 
by expanding a firm’s production possibilities, an invention (as 
opposed to technological information generally) is a “thing” 
that can be valued by the neoclassical firm. This article will 
  
 32 See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2012) [hereinafter Liivak, Rescuing the Invention]; Oskar 
Liivak, Finding Invention, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 63-68 (2012) [hereinafter Liivak, 
Finding Invention] (uncovering the historic understanding of the invention as the set of 
embodiments disclosed in the patent and applying that understanding to explain a 
variety of claim scope decisions). 
 33 See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32, at 4-6; Liivak, Finding 
Invention, supra note 32, at 63-68. 
 34 See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32, at 4-6; Liivak, Finding 
Invention, supra note 32, at 59-60; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the 
“Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1862-63 (2012) (developing an “external” 
definition of the invention and contrasting that against a “claim-centered” definition of 
the invention and ultimately arguing for the “external” definition as better fitting 
patent law and policy). 
 35 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring that a patent “specification” 
contain sufficient detail “to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . .”). 
 36 Cf. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 371-72 (7th ed. 1998); see also infra note 166 and accompanying text (further 
discussing production plans). 
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show that a critical aspect of the patent system’s modular 
design architecture is achieved by limiting patent protection to 
inventions, and that such a system can support an 
economically justified market in those inventions even though 
a more general market for information may well prove 
problematic. In other words, we can justify the patent system 
when we view it as providing the legal support for a socially 
beneficial market for the voluntary exchange of inventions. 
There are three relatively high-level ways to theoretically 
view the intervention suggested here: a property-based 
intervention, an economic intervention, and an adjudicatory 
intervention. As to property, in previous work, I highlighted how 
traditional property evolved during the 1800s—from an 
institution that aimed to prevent competition to an institution 
that now sits at the core of fostering competition.37 The theory 
emphasized here similarly shifts our notion of patents from a 
type of industrial policy toward a species of property for 
undergirding a market for inventions.38  
As an economic matter, this reorientation of patent 
theory also bears some structural resemblance to Robert 
Lucas’s criticism of macroeconomics.39 The so-called Lucas 
critique called into question macroeconomic models and their 
policy prescriptions because they were not built on policy 
invariant microeconomic foundations.40 Patent law’s current 
narrative focuses on macroeconomic parameters such as the 
optimal amounts of innovation and other such aggregate 
quantities. Many of its current policy prescriptions for specific 
issues—e.g., remedies—are recognized as having elements of 
circular reasoning.41 In contrast, the market narrative 
developed here aims to build the patent system up from 
individual transactions between inventors and those that can use 
those inventions. In line with Lucas’s broader critique, this new 
market narrative focuses the patent system on more concrete 
  
 37 See Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to 
Intellectual Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1180-81 (2012).  
 38 See id. 
 39 See generally Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Econometric Policy Evaluation: A 
Critique, 1 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 19-46 (1976), 
reprinted in THEORY, POLICY, INSTITUTIONS: PAPERS FROM THE CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER 
SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 257-84 (Karl Brunner & Alan Meltzer eds., 1983). 
 40 Id. at 258, 261-62, 267, 273, 277.  
 41 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2044 (2007); John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and 
Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2115 (2007).  
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microeconomic behavior, which opens the door to a more thorough 
microeconomic analysis and hopefully, to consensus.  
Lastly, the shift also aids the adjudication of patent law. 
In the current theory, judges are forced to decide cases, yet 
they rarely see whether those decisions in fact lead to aggregate 
benefits for innovation. With our current incentive narrative, 
that causal connection is fraught with confounding factors and 
judges may feel at sea in these cases. Although the technological 
component of patent cases is blamed for the judicial dislike of 
patent cases at times, I suspect that this decoupling of judicial 
decision-making from clear societal benefit and justice may 
actually be the more disagreeable aspect of patent cases. 
Learned Hand noted this disconnect in his testimony before the 
Senate. Based on his extensive “experience . . . from the many 
cases that came to [his] attention,”42 he was asked, “Did [patents] 
on the whole promote the arts and sciences?” Learned Hand 
lamented, “That is just what a judge never gets . . . , how 
essential [the patent] was for the progress of the 
arts . . . . [Judges] have no idea . . . whatever . . . as to how the 
system itself is in fact influencing the production of 
inventions.”43 In the current narrative, judges are forced to 
decide without any real ability to see the decision’s impact on the 
overall purpose of the system. In contrast, the system’s purpose 
with the market narrative is narrower—to enable specific socially 
beneficial transactions between patent holders and users of those 
inventions.44 For that system, a judge makes a quite different type 
of decision, which takes place in far more familiar territory. It 
allows the judge to use institutional competence and experience 
from other areas of commercial and private law in regulating and 
channeling behavior in this market as well. All three of these 
conceptual views of the market narrative show how its adoption 
would benefit the patent system.  
Part I of this article describes current patent theory and 
its emphasis on balancing access against exclusion. It then 
details patent theory’s unresolved indeterminacy and other 
problematic features. Part II explores an enticing alternative 
where private decision-making alone, without government 
inducement, guides the allocation of resources in the 
  
 42 Hand on Patent Reform, supra note 18, at 116. 
 43 Id. 
 44 In this sense, this market narrative focuses much closer on actual 
innovation rather than just the act of invention. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 88-89 (4th prtg. 1951) (discussing the distinction 
between invention and innovation). 
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production and dissemination of technology. That section 
describes the conventional view that such a straightforward 
market for technology would be fatally flawed. It details work by 
both Kenneth Arrow and Paul Samuelson, which cautions 
against relying on such a simple market for technology. Despite 
those widely held reservations, the section ends by providing an 
intriguing counter example—a specific package of technology, a 
cost-saving process—that can overcome both Samuelson and 
Arrow’s objections. Part III takes that example and generalizes 
its exceptional properties in order to build a patent system that 
supports the voluntary exchange of inventions. Surprisingly, 
though this new normative theory is different in kind from 
existing theories, the patent system that is needed to back such 
a theory is not very different at all from our existing patent 
statute. Though our existing patent statute can serve this new 
normative goal, the section will highlight how our 
interpretation and emphasis of those statutory features will 
have to change. Section V describes some implications of this 
new normative view and describes future research questions. 
I. PATENT INCENTIVE THEORY AND ITS FAILURE 
This section describes the current normative framework 
for patent law. Right now, patent law is seen as a necessary 
intervention in the existing free-market economy where patents 
aim to grant “above-market” rewards to inventors such that 
society as a whole undertakes the optimal amount of inventive 
activity. This section then describes how that normative 
framework has failed to provide a tractable, determinate 
narrative. The section further lists a number of related 
deficiencies in addition to that primary failure.  
A. Patent Incentive Theory 
As to intellectual property and innovation policy, there 
is one point of agreement: technological advancement matters.45 
  
 45 See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in CIVIL LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 134 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (citation 
omitted) (“Robert Solow demonstrated that technological advancement and increased 
human capital of the labor force accounted for most (between 80 and 90 percent) of the 
annual productivity increase in the US economy between 1909 and 1949, with 
increases in the capital/labor ratio accounting for the remainder. . . . It is now widely 
recognized that technological advancement and enhanced human capital are the 
principal engines of economic growth in the United States and other industrialized 
countries.”); see also Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 
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In a free market with its emphasis on competition (i.e., copying 
the success of others), there is agreement that we need to “do 
something,”46 since “a competitive market may not give enough 
incentive to invest in knowledge . . . .”47 With competitors 
aggressively copying ideas, the market price for technological 
information will plummet to its near-zero marginal cost.48 The 
resulting market revenue for the original creator “will not cover 
the costs of developing the [information], and therefore the 
market will not work.”49 Without “do[ing] something . . . , 
everyone will want to be an imitator, not an inventor.”50 
Yet, while there is agreement that we should do 
something, agreeing on what we should do is much more 
controversial. Broadly speaking, this underproduction problem 
has engendered a number of alternative solutions—e.g., prizes, 
research contracts, patent regimes, and, more recently, 
commons-based production.51 Of these, some worry about the 
“principal drawback” of such government prizes and contracts: 
“that they require the government to value innovation, or to 
decide which projects are likely to produce value in the 
future.”52 It is thought that a system of exclusive rights can 
avoid some of these informational problems. Indeed, the U.S. 
Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to provide for a 
patent system that promotes progress in the “useful [a]rts” by 
granting exclusive rights to inventors for their discoveries.53 As 
a result, much of the legal commentary has focused only on 
such exclusive rights regimes.54 This article is no exception. 
  
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1476-1570 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell 
eds., 2007) (discussing Solow’s work); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property 
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 699 & n.4 (2001) (same). 
 46 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 8. 
 47 SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 58 (2004). 
 48 Id. at 35. 
 49 Id. 
 50 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 8. 
 51 See Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, 
Prizes, and Research Contracts, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 696 (1983); see also Amy 
Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 985-87 (2012) (revisiting those alternate options 
and Brian Wright’s earlier work). 
 52 Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 45 (2001). 
 53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have [p]ower . . . [T]o 
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to 
[a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and 
[d]iscoveries . . . .”). 
 54 Though further below it has some thoughts on the suitability of these 
alternatives. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 58 (concluding that “reward” is to 
“some degree” “linked to the social value of the invention”); WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., 
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Though there are a number of normative theories 
explaining this exclusive rights approach for patent law,55 they 
are all variations on one basic story.56 The “classic utilitarian 
theory of patent law,”57 a narrative that we have used “for 200 
years,”58 aims to “encourage [inventors] to invest in research and 
development by the prospect that their invention will be 
patented.”59 In other words, “the government issues you a patent; 
the patent gives you the right to exclude; you can use that right 
to exclude competitors in order to raise your price, and 
therefore make more money; and that fact in turn gives you an 
incentive to create.”60 
That story is quite “simple.”61 We aim to get the optimal 
amount of innovation by artificially making it more profitable 
through granting patents.62 Our normative aim is “inducement”63 
by way of exclusive rights with occasional “limited market 
power.”64 Patent policy debates revolve around the modulation of 
patent scope and duration so as to produce that correct amount 
of reward and inducement. 
In 1934, economist Arnold Plant described this narrative 
and the patent system generally as “a subsidy for invention.”65 And 
now, eighty years later, we still think about the patent system that 
way. Recent work alternatively describes the system as  
a mechanism the State uses to induce innovation . . . , property-like 
rights used by inventors to collect payment from society as 
  
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 38 (1973) (“The 
patent system has an advantage over a system of government grants in that it is 
consumer oriented. There is no payoff unless consumers deem the invention worth 
paying for.”). 
 55 See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 66. 
 56 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 68 (observing that the various theories 
of patent law “are not so much alternatives to this classic incentive-to-invent story as 
they are efforts to understand how the incentive works in practice and to balance the 
costs and benefits in the light of economic evidence about how innovation and patent 
incentives work.”). 
 57 Id.  
 58 Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patent in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 139 (2000). 
 59 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 68. 
 60 Lemley, supra note 58, at 139. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 66; see also BOWMAN, supra note 54, 
at x (“Without patent protection, patent law assumes, rapid copying by others (who 
have not incurred the cost) would greatly diminish wealth-creating activity, to the 
detriment of the community. Invention would be underrewarded.”).  
 63 Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 986 & n.57 (referring to the patent system as 
inducing works). 
 64 SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 58. 
 65 BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 19 (describing Arnold Plant’s view of patent law).  
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inducement for their innovative efforts, . . . [or] a mode of 
cataloguing which third-parties should provide recompense to the 
inventor so as to guarantee the appropriate level of R & D and 
commercialization incentives . . . .66  
Patent law purposefully grants patent holders the ability to set 
up a toll,67 whose aggregate revenue will optimally incentivize 
inventive activity. 
Yet though facially simple, that narrative creates serious 
costs as patent law aims to cure this supply-side problem.68 
Because of the nonrival nature of information, it is widely 
thought that “there is no efficiency reason to deprive anyone of 
use . . . . [and if the price for the information were zero,] everyone 
would be served, and access would be efficient.”69 If the price for a 
piece of information were non-zero (as it must be if patent law 
hopes to provide any incentive), then an inefficient use of the 
information would be assumed. Nobel Prize-winning economist 
Kenneth Arrow described such exclusive rights schemes:  
[I]nformation obtained, say a new method of production, should, 
from the welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart 
from the costs of transmitting information). This insures optimal 
utilization of the information but of course provides no incentive for 
investment in research . . . . In a free enterprise economy, inventive 
activity is supported by using the invention to create property rights; 
precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization 
of the information.70 
This Gordian knot is the incentive versus access paradox.71 As 
Clarissa Long nicely put it, “[t]he result is that without legal 
protection, not enough information will be produced; but with 
legal protection, not enough information will be used.”72  
Patent policy is a balancing of the benefits of the 
incentive scheme against the costs of exclusion. A great deal of 
hand-wringing has focused on whether patent law has made this 
  
 66 Ted M. Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), (manuscript at 18-19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1932834.  
 67 See SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 34 (describing patents as a toll). 
 68 Id. at 35-36.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Arrow, supra note 26, at 616-17 (emphasis added). Arrow won the Nobel 
Prize in 1972. See The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel 1972, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/ 
laureates/1972/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 71 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 488-89 (1996) (providing a thorough exploration of 
the incentive versus access debate).  
 72 Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 632 (2002). 
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compromise wisely.73 It is, as put by economist Suzanne 
Scotchmer, “a tortured solution to the problem of providing a 
public good.”74 It is not thought to fit nicely with the rest of the 
market system: “[T]he whole point of the patent system is to 
provide legal rights that alter the market and thereby induce 
changes in resource allocations.”75 The patent system is a 
“deliberate government intervention[] in the market—a sort of 
mercantilist economic policy for artificially stimulating 
innovation.”76 
B. The Failure and Oddities of the Incentive Narrative 
The above-described normative theory, though it serves 
as the basis for all utilitarian patent theories,77 is a failure on 
many different levels. As detailed below, its primary failure is 
its inability to justify the patent system. Related to that 
failure, this section further describes other curious features of 
that system relevant for contrasting the normative theory 
against the market for inventions narrative developed in later 
sections. In particular, the incentive narrative is an absolutist 
system of infringement, devoid of both a concept of harm and 
the potential for a more nuanced system. In addition, this 
narrative develops a very curious concept of patent transactions 
where naked exclusion and permission, as opposed to useful 
technologies, are the heart of the exchange.  
1. Intractable Indeterminacy 
The biggest failure of the incentive narrative is its 
inability to provide a satisfactory justification for the patent 
system. As described above, the existing normative theory aims 
to balance the costs and benefits of exclusion. Yet, identifying 
and then quantifying both the benefits and the costs of the 
exclusion has turned out to be nearly impossible. It is a 
  
 73 See BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 50-51; id. at xi (focusing on “the patent reward 
system in terms of whether it is likely to underreward or overreward invention.”). 
 74 SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 34. 
 75 Golden, supra note 25, at 508-09. 
 76 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 8. 
 77 Prospect theory and its related commercialization variants are sometimes 
seen as distinct from the more reward-oriented theories. See Edmund W. Kitch, The 
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977); see also 
KIEFF ET AL., supra note 4, at 68 n.170. Yet these are often seen as incentive theories 
where the incentive is the incentive to commercialize as opposed to incentive to invent 
or disclose. Id. As such they suffer from the same intractability as the more dominant 
incentive to invent and disclose theories.  
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problem that “is peculiarly unsusceptible to empirical proof,”78 
where “the trade-offs . . . are much more extreme and difficult 
to measure. No one knows what the optimal duration of 
patent . . . protection should be, or whether there should be 
different periods of protection in different areas of enterprise. 
Some even doubt whether we need any protection at all.”79 The 
economics of the patent system and information more generally 
has remained “extraordinarily indeterminate.”80 The fact is that 
the current patent narrative “has never developed a consistent, 
usable theory for determining the appropriate duration and 
scope of IP rights. . . . Determining the optimal amount of IP 
protection is exceedingly difficult.”81 Fritz Machlup famously 
provided the following disheartening conclusion: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to 
recommend instituting one. But since we have had [one] for a long 
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.82 
In short, the basic incentive narrative “has some serious 
problems,”83 and it is time “to question the classic incentive 
theory.”84 One solution would be to just try harder85 to work out 
the cost-benefit balance, but “finding the right balance between 
[appropriation versus access] has proven to be one of the most 
difficult questions that government policy has ever had to 
face.”86 In fact, I, along with others, fear it may be impossible.87 
As a result, “[w]e don’t, in fact, know for sure what impact 
patents have on innovation.”88 Without proof, many question 
  
 78 BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 48-51. 
 79 HERBERT HOVENKAMP & CHRISTINA BOHANNON, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT 46 (2012). 
 80 BOYLE, supra note 19, at 41. 
 81 HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 7. 
 82 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM] (prepared by Fritz Machlup). 
 83 Lemley, supra note 58, at 148.  
 84 Id. at 142. 
 85 See Lemley, supra note 24, 1067 (noting that “[h]ard as it is to get the 
balance right, we will never do it if we simply stop trying”). 
 86 HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 404. 
 87 See Liivak, supra note 37, at 1173-76; ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2-3 (2011). 
 88 Lemley, supra note 58, at 139. 
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the patent system and stress alternatives.89 Others have even 
called for outright abandonment of the system.90  
2. Behavioral Coarseness without a Concept of Harm  
In addition to its intractable indeterminacy, the current 
narrative is conspicuously coarse. Though certainly the 
narrative involves a complex balancing of interests in 
designing the system, it provides little nuanced behavioral 
guidance to patent holders once those patents are issued. In 
fact, the current narrative gives the patent holder rather blunt 
and direct instruction: use the exclusion in the patent to make 
money. Justice Douglas noted that “[a] patent empowers the 
owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the 
leverage of that monopoly.”91 In other words, “once a patent has 
been issued the patentee can be expected to utilize the 
exclusive rights he has been granted to maximize his reward.”92 
There is a similar absolutism regarding infringement. 
Conceptualized as a toll that produces incentives, excusing any 
infringer threatens to upset Congress’s balance of incentives. 
The result is a patent narrative that inherently portrays 
enforcement and infringement in an absolute and non-
contextual light.  
Though many might lament the rise of patent trolls, the 
current narrative provides little ability to criticize that 
behavior. The only recourse is to criticize the patents as 
improperly issued. But for properly issued patents, the current 
narrative expects aggressive assertion. In their recent book on 
intellectual property, Bohannon and Hovenkamp highlight this 
coarse nature of the current narrative. As a reform, they focus 
on the lack of a harm requirement in patent infringement 
actions. They suggest, “[a]s a first step in their own reform 
journeys, drafters of the IP laws need to develop a more 
disciplined conception of IP injury . . . which would 
require . . . demonstrable injury . . . .”93 Not only would a harm 
requirement enable the fine-tuning of patent exclusion and 
remedies, it would also produce a narrative with better public 
relations than the current aggressive assertion mode of the 
  
 89 See Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 973 n.7 (revisiting the alternative modes 
previously explored by Wright). 
 90 See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 15, at 7. 
 91 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). 
 92 BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 22. 
 93 HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 51 (internal quotations omitted). 
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incentive narrative.94 As long as we are using the current 
incentive narrative, however, I doubt there is conceptual room 
for a nuanced concept of harm. 
3. Markets for Exclusion Rather than for Technology 
Another oddity of the current narrative is the nature of 
its transactions. As a general matter, “market transactions are 
arms-length, anonymous, and typically involve an exchange of 
a good for money.”95 Surely, when we make the leap from 
tangible property to intellectual property, we expect the “goods” 
to become less tangible and more ephemeral, but, in the 
current narrative, the “goods” vanish altogether.96 Transactions 
in the incentive narrative are exchanges of money, not for a 
useful “thing,” but instead for a promise not to sue.97 This 
outcome is a direct result of viewing the patent system as a 
mechanism that sets up tolls to provide incentives, and those 
transactions are becoming a highly visible part of the modern 
patent system. This has led to “the development of what [Mark 
Lemley] call[s] ‘licensing shops,’ that is, significant corporate 
entities with little or no business purpose other than to 
accumulate and license patents . . . what they mostly seem to 
‘produce’ are patents and patent licenses.”98 
Such a market in “naked exclusion” should strike us as 
quite odd. Despite ultimately aiming to “promote the progress 
of the useful arts,” technology exchange is not an obligation 
placed on patent holders.99 In fact, the transactions need not 
include any technological exchange. Nonetheless, some have 
aimed to improve the patent system by reducing the frictions in 
  
 94 See Liivak, supra note 37, at 1176-79 (describing inherent animosity 
created by current incentive narrative).  
 95 ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 4 (2001). 
 96 See generally Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 
20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1477, 1499 (2005) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill & Henry Smith, 
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L. J. 357, 359 (2001)) 
(drawing a conceptual picture of “normal” market transactions where goods are exchanged 
and where the legal rights that protect those goods automatically move with the goods). 
 97 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 
75, 95 (2005) (concluding that a patent gives the holder “a right to try to exclude”). 
 98 Lemley, supra note 58, at 140-41. 
 99 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423 (1908); see 
also Oskar Liivak & Eduardo Penalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent 
Law, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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that market.100 Indeed, one of the primary defenses of patent 
trolls has been their injection of liquidity into this “market.”101  
Meanwhile, markets in technology and inventions look 
and feel quite different. In these latter two markets, patent 
exclusion surely plays a critical background role. Yet, their 
central focus is transactions, where payment is exchanged for 
technological information or inventions, respectively. They 
surely involve an exchange of legal relations as well, but these 
are a consequence of (and background features of) the exchange 
of the useful technological “thing.” Such markets look much 
more like traditional property rather than some industrial 
policy that induces wealth transfers.102 These markets and their 
transactions involve a “thing”—the technology or the 
invention—and they involve property rights, which surround 
that asset and provide a “field of legal protection” around it.103  
The current “thing”-less market for exclusion has 
created a system where interest in the patent system may stem 
not from any real interest in inventions or progress in the 
useful arts, but instead in rent-seeking via exclusion. As 
relayed by Colleen Chien, there is growing sense that 
“[i]nvesting in invention is for schmucks.”104 The implication is 
that the smart money no longer invents but rather just collects 
and asserts patents. It is hard to imagine a functioning patent 
system where such a disconnect can exist, yet that disconnect 
is the natural result of our coarse patent narrative.  
Consequently, the current narrative leads to a patent 
system with an absolutist focus on exclusion, devoid of a focus 
on useful technology and its dissemination. If, indeed, the 
economic case could be made for that strange system, I would 
learn to live with it; but as shown above, the patent system 
certainly cannot make such claims of justification and I doubt 
it ever will. Beyond failing to provide a stable theoretical 
  
 100 See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 258 (2007). 
 101 See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketpalce: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 311, 
(2011) (noting that “growth in the patent marketplace, accompanied by an increase in 
liquidity, transactions, and business models for buyers, sellers, and intermediaries”). 
 102 See Liivak, supra note 37, at 1179-82.  
 103 Merges, supra note 96, at 1499 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104 Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 19-20 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. 
Law Working Paper No. 09-12, 2012) (quoting Nicolas White, Comment to Now that IP 
Is Mainstream, Let’s Not Mess This Once in a Lifetime Opportunity Up, INTELL. ASSET 
MGMT. (July 6, 2012, 10:23 PM), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g= 
b0610bab-d371-4401-bd6f-6b12368b8eb0) (internal quotation marks omitted), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146251. 
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foundation, the current incentive narrative leaves ample room 
for patent trolls to plausibly deny societal harm and blame.  
II. A MARKET FOR INVENTIONS, NOT FOR TECHNOLOGY AND 
NOT FOR NAKED EXCLUSION 
Intractability, though disheartening, does not doom the 
patent system (though it should doom the incentive-based 
narrative). There is an alternative: if the cost-benefit balance is 
impossible to resolve, then maybe we should just stop trying to 
solve it (at least directly). Instead, we should try to design our 
patent system around a narrative where this elusive optimal 
allocation is an outcome of the system, rather than as a 
necessary but unknowable policy input.  
Certainly such a wish list seems fanciful; yet, consider 
for a moment that despite its own imperfections, our private 
property market system performs exactly this feat every day. 
The private property system does not need to know the right 
amount of shoe stores or Thai restaurants to build as a policy 
input; those levels are an output, a result of system design.105 
Furthermore, though every item of tangible property comes 
with a powerful exclusionary shield, that exclusion ultimately 
should not prevent the highest-valued user from utilizing the 
tangible resource. These are strong exclusive rights, but we 
don’t suffer the same exclusion costs as in intellectual property. 
Finally, while the traditional property system is certainly not 
perfect,106 especially considering distributional issues, it does 
enjoy something that has eluded patent law: strong economic 
justification, stability, and, perhaps most important for a 
property system, widespread acceptance. 
This section explores the possibility of building a patent 
narrative along lines similar to that employed for the private 
property market: socially beneficial behavior driven not by 
government-created incentives, but rather by private decision-
making backed by property rights.107 Despite its allure and 
simplicity, there are thought to be long-standing obstacles to 
  
 105 See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A 
Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1174 (2008) (arguing that a transactional 
model “permit[s] the exposition of a model that need not rely on ex ante assumptions 
about optimal R&D expenditures”). 
 106 In addition to distributional issues, there are also problems associated with 
optimality and the theory of the second best. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s 
Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 390 (2008). 
 107 In earlier work I began sketching a research plan for searching for such a 
system. See generally Liivak, supra note 37, at 1167-68. 
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such a simple institution for information exchange. Though 
agreeing with those objections generally, this section presents 
an example where in fact those objections do not hold and 
concludes that a system of socially beneficial resource allocation 
can result from private decision-making and voluntary 
exchange. As will be explored in greater detail in the next 
section, that exceptional example is one member of a general set, 
where the aim is not market exchange of technological 
information generally, but rather the narrower (and critically 
different) goal of voluntary exchange of inventions. 
A. Structuring an Economic Narrative for a Technology 
Market  
Others have already developed foundational work, 
pointing out the important benefits the patent system provides 
in enabling markets for technological exchange.108 Robert 
Merges,109 Asish Arora,110 Paul Heald,111 Henry Smith,112 and 
others113 have all put emphasis on the patent system’s role in 
supporting a market for technology. In summarizing much of 
this work, Merges lauds intellectual property rights for 
“serv[ing] as the starting points for negotiations and exchange, 
  
 108 See generally MERGES, supra note 87, at 154; ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, 
at 261 (“[I]ntellectual property rights encourage the rise of a market for technology.”). 
 109 See generally Merges, supra note 96 (emphasizing the role intellectual 
property rights play in encouraging transactions). 
 110 See generally Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, 
Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004). 
 111 See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 473, 489 (2005) (arguing from a transaction cost perspective that “[t]he patent 
form enables the potential transferor to share an information asset without fear of 
misappropriation while assembling the complex team necessary to commercialize a 
new product”). 
 112 Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating 
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1795 (2007). 
 113 See, e.g., David J. Teece, Technological Know-How, Property Rights, and 
Enterprise Boundaries: The Contribution of Arora and Merges, 14 INDUS. & CORP. 
CHANGE 1237, 1239 (2005) (“For far too long, the debate about the patent system has 
neglected consideration of how patents enable enterprises and individual inventors to 
specialize and capture the economies of specialization.”) (parenthetical omitted); Nancy 
T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, Licensing in the Theory of Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 
237, 238 (1985) (“[T]he role of patents in our model is not the traditional role of 
creating monopoly monopolies by prohibiting exploitation of informational spillovers. 
Rather, by protecting property rights, patents here open the market for trading 
technological information.”); ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 262 (“Point to the role of 
patents in facilitating transactions in technology. This role of patents has largely been 
ignored in informal economic analysis, where the focus has been on the trade-off 
between the ex-ante incentives to innovate the ex post advantages of innovation 
diffusion.”). 
2013] ESTABLISHING AN ISLAND OF PATENT SANITY 1355 
[and] setting in motion the great resource-allocating machinery 
so heartily lauded by theorists such as McCloskey and Sen.”114 
Though I agree with those earlier works, there is still 
one critical element that is missing. Many of us think that such 
transactions are likely socially beneficial, yet that optimistic 
outlook is still ultimately grounded in “faith”115—and that just 
doesn’t seem to be good enough anymore. Despite identifying 
positive aspects of the patent system, the simple fact is that we 
still cannot make a strong argument that supports such a 
system116: “try as we might, law and economics scholars have 
never established an efficiency-based (or utilitarian) 
justification for the field. There is no lock-solid proof that 
overall social welfare would decline if IP protection were 
suddenly removed.”117 
The patent system just does not have an accepted 
economic framework like the one used to justify the market in 
tangible goods. As Hovenkamp and Bohannon recently noted, 
there is substantially “more consensus about the legal framework 
for encouraging traditional competition than about the framework 
for facilitating optimum innovation.”118 In particular, they write 
that the relative incoherence of intellectual property (in relation 
to antitrust and price competition) stems from the well-accepted 
“basic outline of the requirements for competition” and 
intellectual property’s lack of such a model and consensus.119 
One problem is that much of existing transaction-based 
discussion still situates itself in the incentive-based narrative. 
In other words, beneficial technological transactions are seen 
as one of the many positive behaviors that are induced by the 
patent. This article aims to look at the transactions on their 
own, rather than having its benefits burdened by the 
intractable costs associated with the incentive view and its 
absolute view of exclusion. By doing so, the article hopes to 
make claims about the transaction model for patents that can 
alone justify at least part of the patent system. 
The purpose of the following sections (and, indeed, the 
purpose of this article) is to develop that economic framework 
  
 114 MERGES, supra note 87, at 155. 
 115 See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 253. 
 116 See ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 279 (“Intellectual property rights are a 
sine qua non for the development of such markets. But given the nature of knowledge, 
property rights (such as patents) in knowledge can create problems.”). 
 117 MERGES, supra note 87, at 6. 
 118 HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 45. 
 119 Id. at 45-47. 
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for a market of inventions and then to identify the patent 
system necessary to support such a market. Yet, the aim is 
more than to build an accepted framework for the patent 
system that is modeled on the traditional market. Rather, the 
aim is to integrate the patent system as a natural extension of 
the price system and the traditional market, and to end patent 
system exceptionalism.120 
To fully integrate the patent system into the broader 
economic framework, it is worth recalling the overall purpose of 
economics. As put by Lionel Robbins, “Economics is the science 
which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends 
and scarce means which have alternate uses.”121 As has long 
been recognized, both the traditional market and the patent 
system share the same basic goal: “the efficient allocation of 
scarce resources for those products and services consumers 
value.”122 For patent law, though technological knowledge itself 
is not rivalrously consumed, scholars have emphasized for 
some time that the patent system—as a form of private 
property—needs to focus on the efficient allocation of the scarce 
resources—e.g., time and lab equipment consumed in creating 
the invention.123  
To understand the form of the patent system’s economic 
justification and how it fits into the broader economic 
framework, it is also worth recalling the form of the economic 
support for the free market in tangible goods. Economists have 
used a two-stage argument to justify the allocation of scarce 
tangible goods through the voluntary market.124 First, economists 
developed the notion of efficiency, an overall “top-level” condition 
describing the optimal allocation and distribution of those 
tangible scarce resources.125 Second, economists have shown that 
this optimal allocation can be reached through voluntary, 
private exchanges guided by the price system.126 Based on this 
socially beneficial and voluntary exchange narrative, property 
rights aim to prevent any harmful acts that would interfere 
with that voluntary exchange. Though most think it cannot be 
  
 120 See Liivak, supra note 37, at 1169-73 (arguing for ending the patent 
exceptionalism where patents are seen as interfering with the existing market rather 
than naturally extending that market). 
 121 LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF 
ECONOMIC SCIENCE 16 (2d ed. 1945).  
 122 BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 13. 
 123 See Kitch, supra note 77, at 266; Smith supra note 112, at 1745. 
 124 See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 36, at 62. 
 125 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 28, at 23. 
 126 See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 36, at 62. 
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done, this article argues that the same methodology can be 
extended to structure and justify at least part of the current 
patent system. 
B. Allocating Scarce Resources Toward Creating 
Information 
In building an economic model for allocating scarce 
resources toward creating and distributing useful technology, 
the first question is whether there exists an analogous “top-
down” condition that can identify when and where scarce 
resources should be consumed; and indeed, economists have 
defined that condition. Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, 
economists like Howard Bowen and Erik Lindahl worked on 
the more general problem of allocating resources toward 
production of public goods. In the 1950s, Paul Samuelson 
continued that work and described the proper allocation of 
resources for the creation of a public good, now known as the 
“Samuelson condition.” It states that resources should be 
directed toward production and dissemination of a public good 
up to the optimal point—that is, when the collective preference 
for that last increment of public good equals the preference for 
the private good that could have been made from the scarce 
resources consumed in creating that last increment of the 
public good.127 Just as the efficiency condition for tangible goods 
could guide a benevolent social planner in the allocation of 
private goods, so could the Samuelson condition for public 
goods. Thus, as a theoretical matter, we can describe when 
scarce resources should be consumed for creating and 
disseminating technological public goods. The critical question 
is whether private decision-making can arrive at those socially 
beneficial allocations. In Samuelson’s words, “The solution 
‘exists’; the problem is how to ‘find’ it.”128  
Economic theory has shown that voluntary exchange of 
tangible goods in equilibrium leads to the optimal use of those 
  






where MRTzy is the alternative uses for the scarce resources that will be consumed in 
creating the invention z and MRSizy is the ith person’s preference for the public good z 
relative to those alternative uses (i.e., relative to private good y); see also CORNES & 
SANDLER, supra note 28, at 23 (using the notation adopted here). 
 128 Samuelson, supra note 29, at 389. 
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goods.129 Could a similar narrative be developed for the creation 
and distribution of technology? As to finding such a voluntary 
mechanism for satisfying the Samuelson condition, the 
structure of the condition itself offers a tantalizing possibility 
that private decision-making could be the answer. Assume 
some private actor with the capability to create a public good 
and to estimate the scarce resources that will be consumed in 
creating the public good. If the private actor could collect the 
benefit provided to each user of the public good, then a profit-
motivated private decision-maker would undertake projects 
creating public goods only when it would be the socially beneficial 
use of those resources. Such a scheme, driven by private profit 
motives and private decision-making, could lead to a Pareto 
optimal production of public goods.130 But, as will be detailed 
below, most have concluded that this possibility is a mirage and 
that such private decision-making for the creation and sale of 
information will be fatally defective. So what is the problem?  
C. Objections to Private Decision-Making and Markets for 
Information  
Though private decision-making is an alluring solution 
to the public goods problem, there are a number of objections, 
including towering, Nobel Prize-winning objections. Indeed, the 
conventional view is that such a market for technological 
information would not work. It is thought that the exotic world 
of nonrival ideas is just too different from tangible goods, 
making the tangible market’s relatively simple and accepted 
narrative inapposite. In fact, as one comprehensive survey 
acknowledged, “there is very little on how a market in knowledge 
would function, other than the appreciation that such markets 
would be characterized by a number of imperfections.”131 While 
Paul Samuelson broadly objected to a private market for public 
goods, Kenneth Arrow presented more specific objections to a 
private market for the public good of information.  
  
 129 See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 36, at 62 (discussing tangible goods 
such as “food, clothing, and shelter”). 
 130 See id. 
 131 ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 1; see also David J. Teece, Towards an 
Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 49 (1982) 
(“Markets do not work well as the institutional mode for trading knowhow.”); Teece, 
supra note 113, at 1237 (focusing attention of problems with the transfer of tacit 
knowledge).  
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In the initial articulation of the Samuelson condition, 
Samuelson noted that for private goods, there is indeed a 
decentralized “analogue calculating machine”—that is, the 
private market with price competition that reaches the 
optimality condition for private goods.132 Immediately thereafter, 
though, he forcefully argued that as to public goods and the 
Samuelson condition, “no decentralized pricing system can serve 
to determine optimally these levels of collective consumption.”133 
He argued, “it is in the selfish interest of each person to give 
false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given 
collective consumption activity than he really has . . . .”134 Those 
false signals prevent the public goods’ aggregate revenue from 
reflecting its true collective value and thwart an optimal 
private decision-making system. As a result of this motivation 
“to snatch some selfish benefit in a way not possible under the 
self-policing competitive pricing of private goods . . . it [is] 
impossible for [the theory of public goods] . . . to have that special 
pattern . . . which makes laissez-faire competition even 
theoretically possible as an analogue computer.”135 Though 
alternatives have been explored, the inability “to induce 
consumers to reveal their marginal valuations”136 remains the 
primary obstacle and continues to “make[] it all but impossible to 
determine the optimal level of production for any public good.”137 
To make matters worse, Samuelson’s objections are not 
the only obstacle. In one of the most influential articles to 
examine the economics of information, Kenneth Arrow gave 
several additional rationales for doubting the feasibility of the 
market mechanism to provide optimal levels of investment in 
information production. His article focused on “the determination 
of optimal resource allocation for invention” by “perfect 
competition.”138 Though using the term “invention,” his analysis 
was very broad, examining “the production of knowledge” 
generally.139 The focus of the analysis was on “the special nature 
of information”140 as compared to private goods, and he concluded 
that “a free enterprise economy [would] underinvest in invention 
  
 132 Samuelson, supra note 29, at 388. 
 133 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 134 Id. at 388-89 (emphasis omitted). 
 135 Id. at 389. 
 136 See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A 
Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 639 (2007). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Arrow, supra note 26, at 609. 
 139 Id. 
 140 BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 23; see also Arrow, supra note 26, at 609.  
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and research (as compared with an ideal) . . . .”141 He reached that 
conclusion by highlighting that information possesses, among 
other problems, characteristics that challenge the market model: 
“inappropriability[] and uncertainty.”142 
As to inappropriability, Arrow concluded that “[i]n the 
absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot . . . simply 
sell information on the open market.”143 On this point he made 
two observations. First, “[a]ny one purchaser can destroy the 
monopoly . . . .”144 This is the standard point about the threat 
posed by pirates. Second, remaining one of the most well-known 
arguments in the article, Arrow noted that efforts to sell 
information entail “a fundamental paradox in the determination 
of demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not 
known until he has the information, but then he has in effect 
acquired it without cost.”145 This point is widely cited and is now 
known as “Arrow’s Information Paradox.”146 
In light of these problems with inappropriability, Arrow 
suggested something should be done—i.e., “suitable legal 
measures” involving “property rights.”147 Though they help, 
Arrow argued that even with those property rights, the market 
would remain suboptimal because of remaining problems of 
inappropriability, intractability, and uncertainty.148 Arrow 
argued, “there are obviously enormous difficulties in defining 
in any sharp way an item of information and differentiating it 
from other similar sounding items.”149 He lamented that 
“[p]atent laws would have to be unimaginably complex and 
subtle to permit such appropriation on a large scale.”150  
Lastly, Arrow argued that uncertainty would plague an 
information market. He first noted that uncertainty is part of 
most enterprises and that various risk-shifting mechanisms 
exist, but then argued that uncertainty would be especially 
problematic for “highly risky business activities, including 
invention.”151 He noted that “[i]nformation is not only the 
product of inventive activity, it is also an input . . . ,” and as a 
  
 141 Arrow, supra note 26, at 619. 
 142 Id. at 609.  
 143 Id. at 615. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 27, at 229 n.4. 
 147 Arrow, supra note 26, at 615. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 617. 
 151 Id. at 613.  
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result, “the value of information for use in developing further 
information is much more conjectural . . . .”152 These factors 
together led Arrow to conclude that, even if backed with 
property rights, “a free enterprise economy [would] underinvest 
in invention . . . ,” and that there is therefore “a strong case for 
centralized decision making.”153 
D. A Market for Inventions: A Constructive Proof 
In light of the above objections, if the goal of the patent 
system is to guide the allocation of resources toward the 
creation of technological information generally, then private 
decision-making may not work, and patent theory is destined 
to slog on in its incentive-versus-access indeterminism. Many 
in fact do see the patent system as a standard incentive to 
generate technological information. Ward Bowman argued, 
“[t]he product of a patent is information.”154 Suzanne Scotchmer 
described the system as giving “patent holders . . . an almost 
absolute right to control uses of the knowledge they have 
created.”155 Ed Kitch argued patents alleviate the “fear that the 
fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information 
appropriable by competitors.”156 As long as patent theory conceives 
the goal of the patent system so broadly—as a general system 
that incentivizes generation of technological information—then, 
in light of Arrow’s and Samuelson’s objections, a solely market-
based narrative may well be problematic. When so broadly 
conceived, private decision-making will likely not be able to 
provide the decentralized “analogue calculating machine” 
necessary for allocating resources to innovation. We are stuck 
with the incentive-access paradigm despite its indeterminism 
because we just do not think we have a choice.  
But this article argues that we are asking too much of 
the patent system. Samuelson was considering the public goods 
problem generally when he “emphasized” the problems with 
private provision.157 And Arrow, though using the term 
“invention,” focused on information generation.158 Perhaps some 
narrower view might still work. Might we find some exception 
  
 152 Id. at 618. 
 153 Id. at 619. 
 154 BOWMAN, supra note 54, at 17. 
 155 SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 82-83. 
 156 Kitch, supra note 77, at 276 (emphasis added). 
 157 Samuelson, supra note 29, at 389. 
 158 See Arrow, supra note 26, at 619. 
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that was overlooked? First, Samuelson concluded that “it may 
turn out to be pure luck that within the general domain [of 
information,] there happen[s] to be a subsector with the 
‘simple’ properties of traditional economics.”159 Arrow pointed 
the way, noting that “underinvestment will be greater for basic 
research.”160 Rather than focusing on information generally, 
perhaps we should instead focus on something narrower where 
the market might work. Fairly late-stage, well-developed 
technology may be that narrower, workable regime.  
Both Arrow’s and Samuelson’s objections to a private 
provision are, to a large extent, rooted in the difficulty in 
determining a potential user’s valuation of a public good. For 
Samuelson it was one of strategic under-revelation of the 
valuation, and for Arrow it was one of valuation uncertainty of 
the user. What if this could be overcome? What would happen 
if creators and users both knew the valuation? Would the 
outcome of private provision satisfy the Samuelson condition? 
Economists have examined this issue and have in fact 
shown that under such conditions, an optimal allocation of 
resources can result.161 Furthermore, it should be emphasized that 
under these conditions, “no potential customers of the public good 
are denied access . . . .”162 Together, these are two highly appealing 
characteristics, yet “the informational requirements of [the] model 
are extremely demanding.”163 As a result, “[a]ll are uncomfortable 
with the assumption . . . [of] complete knowledge . . . and [ability 
to] tailor . . . different . . . price[s].”164 Despite worries that such 
model assumptions are “extremely demanding,”165 this part 
provides one relevant example where we can expect those 
stringent conditions to be satisfied. This part will focus on a 
particular type of invention: a cost-saving process. 
Assume an industry produces a single output—a 
product—as a result from a single public domain process that 
transforms a single input. Economists describe such a package 
of technological know-how as a production plan.166 Assume the 
  
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 28, at 243-47 (discussing the analysis 
in Earl A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production of Collective Goods, 50 REV. 
ECON. STAT. 1 (1968)). 
 162 Id. at 247. 
 163 Id. at 248. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See generally DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 233-64 
(1990). At times economists refer to these production plans as netput vectors. See id. at 234.  
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industry is using a well-known process where α units of input 
are consumed to produce a single unit of output.167  
Now presume a person knowledgeable about these 
processes believes, with some expenditure of scarce resources 
and labor, she can improve this industrial process. This person, 
whom we will call the inventor, confidently knows that she can 
consume some of her scarce resources (principally her own time) 
in order to create a more efficient process for producing the same 
output. In other words, this new process can create the same 
unit of output more efficiently using fewer units of input.168 
As discussed above, before addressing private property 
and commodification for a market, consider the social costs and 
benefits of this endeavor. Could an omniscient social planner 
determine when the inventor should consume those scarce 
resources in order to produce that cost-saving invention? As 
discussed earlier, the Samuelson condition provides exactly 
that determination.169 
Now the critical question, which has generally been 
answered in the negative, is whether a market institution driven 
by private decision-making could make those same socially 
beneficial decisions. The critical point is that, though the 
objections from Samuelson and Arrow likely apply to 
technological information in general, they do not apply in this case.  
Valuation can be confidently made for each industry 
participant. A firm that produces qi units of output using the 
new process will value the newer process as qi pinput (β - α).170 
This is their cost savings from using the new process instead of 
the older, public domain process.171 Each firm knows that 
whenever they want to produce a unit of the output, they will 
benefit by using the newer process. There is no room to 
strategically underreport their valuation because both the 
inventor and the firms using the processes know how to value 
the process. A contract can be drawn up where the inventor can 
offer the process to anyone who can utilize it and pricing can be 
set on a royalty per unit of output produced. Though I will 
  
 167 Such a process can be described by the netput vector (α, 1) where α < 0. See 
id. at 234-36.  
 168 Using the earlier notation, that new process could be described by a new 
netput vector (β, 1) for creating the same output where α< β <0. 
 169 See supra Part II.B. 
 170 Using the economic notation from above MRSizy = qi pinput (β - α). 
 171 Blair & Cotter, supra note 52, at 40 n.194 (noting that “the maximum 
payment that a willing licensee would pay is the difference between the maximum 
profit he would earn from using the invention and the maximum profit he would earn 
without the invention”).  
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discuss exclusive rights below,172 negotiations between 
inventors and users need not run into Arrow’s Information 
Paradox.173 As long as firms are assured that the process “works 
for its intended purpose”—i.e., producing one unit of output for 
every β unit of input—then firms can form a valuation of the 
process without knowing exactly how the process works. If a 
firm wants to use the new process, they must obtain a license 
from the inventor.174 The inventor knows that the new process is 
worth qi pinput (β - α) to each firm, and can expect the industry 
participants to agree to a license as long as the range of the 
licensing fee—on a price per unit of output—is within γpinput (β -
 α) where 0<γ<1.175  
With that valuation for each firm, the inventor can 
predict the licensing program’s overall revenue. If the industry 
is producing Q units of output in total, the inventor can expect 
γpinput Q (β - α) total revenue if every user adopts the new 
process. The inventor will undertake creating this cost-saving 
process whenever it is her best option—that is, whenever γ Q pinput 
(β - α) ≥ c, where c is the highest price for the alternative uses of 
those scarce resources that are consumed in creating the new 
process. That decision-making coincides with society’s choice for 
those resources: a privately motivated inventor will make the 
decision to allocate resources toward creating inventions only 
when society would concur with that resource allocation. 
This section showed that there exists at least this one 
example of a special package of technological information that 
can be valued and exchanged in a market. Importantly for that 
example, inventors allocate resources to these cost-saving 
processes when that is the best use of those scarce resources. 
Such an undertaking is an activity of unambiguous social 
benefit that is driven by private decision-making, and no one is 
  
 172 See infra Part III.B. 
 173 See Arrow, supra note 26, at 615. 
 174 Implicit in this model is the assumption that transactions are money in 
exchange for the use of the process alone. The model does not reflect or allow for 
transactions where money is exchanged for promises not to license to other 
competitors. They are non-exclusive licenses for the process alone without the ability to 
pay in order to prevent others from using the process.  
 175 See Darlyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to 
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 640 (2010) 
(discussing the theoretical default value for, γ). The parameter γ ranges from 0 to 1 and 
it represents the fraction of the revenue from the acceptable range that goes to the 
inventor versus the consuming firm. The parameter reflects how successful an inventor 
is in keeping the surplus for themselves. In the absence of competition from other 
inventors I think it is safe to assume that the initial inventor will keep the whole 
surplus (i.e. γ=1). 
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denied use of the invention. The next section expands this one 
specific example to the entire class of inventions and explores 
the patent system necessary to support such a market in 
inventions. This result alone is quite interesting. It suggests 
that, despite our worries, resources dedicated toward creating 
inventions could be allocated by private decision-making alone, 
and again, any firm that wants to use the new process can do 
so. No user is left out.  
III. A PATENT SYSTEM FOR BACKING A MARKET FOR 
INVENTIONS  
This part considers two issues: what exclusive property 
rights are needed to protect this market from third-party harm, 
and how to generalize the quite small “island” of cost-saving 
processes (discussed above) to the more substantial “island” of 
inventions. As to the exclusive rights needs, though the 
transactions are driven by private decision-making, such 
behavior “do[es] not arise simply because the benefits of having 
them outweigh the costs. They require institutions to support 
them.”176 This part explores the institution177—that is, the patent 
system—necessary to support such socially beneficial activity. 
In particular, though the incentives for creation and 
dissemination are derived directly from exchange with those 
that can use the process, the patent system must structure 
itself to support that exchange. This section will discuss that 
system in two parts, which largely coincide with the major 
components of our existing patent system. It first considers the 
question of patentability, namely what types of technological 
packages should be exchanged in this market. Next, it 
considers the exclusive rights and remedies that should 
accompany a patent. 
In discussing patentability and exclusion, the patent 
system needed to support such a market will hew quite close to 
the existing patent system; though, in a number of places the 
emphasis will vary from current practice. Interestingly, most of 
those new interpretations involve reforms that have already 
been individually suggested in the scholarly literature. This 
  
 176 ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 278-79 (“Further, markets develop over 
time with these complementary institutions. This development has to be understood as 
a historical process, with the pace and form of the development influenced by starting 
conditions and chance.”). 
 177 See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS xvii (2011) 
(providing an extended discussion of property and institutions). 
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section shows that these seemingly disparate areas of reform 
can be seen as nudging the patent system toward a substantive 
vision of the invention as the marketable technological 
“thing,”178 and a system where exchange of the invention is the 
system’s normative heart. This market-oriented narrative 
provides an economically justified and unified basis for those 
(until now) separate reforms.  
A. Patentability 
The first role that the patent system plays is gate-
keeping. The patent system thus must distinguish between the 
packages that are and are not appropriate for exchange in this 
market. Arrow and Samuelson emphasized that most packages 
of information cannot be easily commodified for simple market 
exchange. Yet, as shown above, the cost-saving process is an 
exception to that general rule. The characteristics that made a 
cost-saving process amenable to this exchange can be 
generalized since the class of technological “things” that can be 
exchanged in this market is well captured by patent law’s 
definition of an invention: a solution to a technical problem 
that has been refined such that it can be put into practice by 
any person of skill in the art. I have aimed to solidify this 
understanding of the invention in my recent work.179 
Furthermore, a quick look to the gatekeeping statutory 
provisions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112 show that the invention 
and the act of inventing, indeed, are the central features of the 
patent system.180  
1. The Cost-Savings Process 
As discussed above, Arrow argued that both the 
uncertainty and inappropriability of information made 
  
 178 See generally Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and 
Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 382-87 (2005) (discussing the design of 
legal things). 
 179 See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32 at 5; Liivak, Finding 
Invention, supra note 32, at 3-7.  
 180 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006). In addition, not any invention should be 
exchanged. The inventions should also be new and nonobvious. An already existing or 
obvious invention would not be a solution that a person of skill would want to buy. 
There is no reason to clutter this market with such un-needed inventions. In other 
words, the requirements for patentability are designed such that only new, nonobvious, 
and useful invention are patentable and thus available for open exchange in this 
invention market. 
2013] ESTABLISHING AN ISLAND OF PATENT SANITY 1367 
information ill-suited for markets.181 In particular, “the value of 
information in developing further information is much more 
conjectural . . . .”182 In the case of the cost-saving process, those 
issues just do not apply. There, the information—the new 
process—produces the sought-after product, and as a result, 
users can value the process itself. That process had reached a 
level of refinement where it worked and others were ready to 
employ it. That level of refinement allowed the creator to 
approach firms and describe what the process would do for 
them. In an important sense, that cost-saving process—and 
indeed the whole class of inventions generally—requires 
refinement so that both technical and economic details come 
into focus. On the technical side, the inventor can promise that 
a skilled person can utilize the invention to achieve its 
intended purpose. On the financial side, the firm can estimate 
both the costs and benefits of that intended purpose. For the 
cost-saving process, the inventor and the prospective utilizing 
firms could place a value on the process.  
Insofar as valuation is concerned, a cost-saving process 
is likely the easiest case. The existing price system for tangible 
goods should already have relatively well-defined prices for all 
inputs and outputs of that cost-saving process. As the 
hypothetical explored above assumed the cost-saving process to 
be a new process for creating an old product, there was 
assumed to be a well-established existing process in the public 
domain. Given all that economic information, the inventor and 
firms can price the cost-saving process. The ability to make 
quantitative estimates about cost-saving process invention has 
actually been highlighted for some time.183 
Process inventions were an important part of the 
earliest patent systems,184 and are certainly still an important 
  
 181 See supra Part II.C. As to uncertainty, Arrow noted two problems. First, he 
argued that the value of the information was uncertain. Second, information 
generation was risky and unpredictable. See supra notes 138-52.  
 182 Id. 
 183 See, e.g., ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 61 
(“There is some possibility of estimating in money terms social benefit rendered by a 
cost-saving invention . . . . [The benefit] can be estimated by the competitive prices of 
the resources economized in the production of the original output.”); see also WILLIAM 
D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 6 (1969). 
 184 See JUSTINE PILA, THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN INVENTION IN PATENT LAW 24 
(2010) (“[A]n invention in 1623 is [thus] understood to have been an ingenious method 
of working pre-existing materials to produce a useful result in the industrial arts. Put 
differently, it was an industrial art, with ‘art’ in this context requiring an ingenious 
purposive human action on the physical world.” (emphasis added)). 
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part of patentable subject matter.185 Due to their potential for 
valuation, the market narrative described in Part II can 
provide justification for a patent system covering processes. 
Nonetheless, the important question arises whether, beyond 
process inventions, these same arguments can extend to the 
other types of traditional patentable subject matter: “machine[s], 
manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter.”186 Beyond process 
inventions, many have argued that valuation becomes harder. 
Fritz Machlup, among others, argued that “[t]here is little 
possibility, however, of estimating the social benefit of a 
quality-improving invention, and almost no possibility in the 
case of inventions of new products.”187 
2. Inventions Beyond the Cost-Saving Process 
Despite those worries, it really is not clear that the 
valuation of a process and valuation of a machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter is so different. After all, 
the inventor of a new machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter must also disclose both how to make that “thing” and 
how to use it. In particular, in disclosing how to use the 
invention, the inventor is disclosing a process for solving some 
problem, and the utility of the “thing” is directly keyed to the 
utility of that method of use. The main difference between 
valuation of the cost-saving process and the process of using 
some new, nonobvious “thing” is that normally, there will be less 
information about the demand for the new use of that “thing.”  
In addition to valuation uncertainty, Arrow also pointed 
out that the creation of information has other aspects of 
uncertainty.188 He noted that information production was 
uncertain on the cost side of the equation since information 
generation “must be a risky process, in that the output 
(information obtained) can never be predicted perfectly from 
the inputs.”189 Should these types of uncertainties matter? Does 
  
 185 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (listing “process[es]” as one of the enumerated 
classes of patentable subject matter). 
 186 Id. 
 187 ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 61; see also 3 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 293 (3d ed. 2008) (“[V]alue is almost 
impossible to determine, apart from such an obvious case as an improved process that 
reduces everyone’s production costs by, say, 10 percent.”). 
 188 See Arrow, supra note 26, at 616.  
 189 Id. 
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that extra uncertainty in the demand curve make inventions 
ill-suited for a market exchange? 
I argue that it should not. In fact, those inventors who 
are willing to take on this risk are exactly those that the patent 
bargain addresses. In other words, the target demographic of 
the system is those with technical ability combined with the 
ability to discern what solutions are needed (i.e., demanded by 
the public). That type of uncertainty is very similar to 
uncertainties that make life challenging for any firm selling 
tangible goods and services. With its purpose of undergirding a 
market for inventions, the patent system should be seen as 
embracing not just inventors per se, but inventors as 
entrepreneurs.190 In other words, though some uncertainty 
remains—and surely valuation outside the cost-saving process 
context will be more difficult—as a class, inventions have 
properties that enable valuation such that rational economic 
decisions can be made about both their creation and sale. 
3. The Difficulty of Tracing Unauthorized Uses 
In addition to uncertainty, Arrow also pointed out that 
tracing difficulties made information largely inappropriable. 
He argued that a patent system that could track and enforce 
the unauthorized usage of most pieces of information would be 
“unimaginably complex and subtle.”191 But for the cost-saving 
process, these tracing concerns have far less force. The cost-
saving process is a specific set of physical steps that produces 
the output product. Though such industrial techniques are 
often practiced behind closed doors, there is no theoretical 
problem with enforcing exclusive rights over that particular 
process. Even if the issue merits further exploration, the 
invention appears to be close to the right legal construct that 
identifies the class of technological “things” able to be valued 
and commodified.  
  
 190 See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 
(Augustus M. Kelly reprt. 1964) (1921), available at http://library.mises.org/ 
books/Frank%20H%20Knight/Risk,%20Uncertainty,%20and%20Profit.pdf (discussing 
entrepreneurial aspects of business innovators). 
 191 Arrow, supra note 26, at 617. 
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4. The Invention & Property Modularity 
An application of the economist Herbert Simon’s concept 
of modularity,192 which is further applied to the design of 
property rights in the work of scholars like Henry Smith and 
Carliss Baldwin, can assist this discussion.193 Simon’s work 
“explain[ed] that the decomposition of a complex problem into 
separate, more elementary subproblems, is an organizational 
design issue.”194 As stressed by Henry Smith, such parsing of 
problems into manageable parts reduces information costs, 
which are critical aspects of property rights systems.195 
Simon’s contribution to property theory provides 
important support for the arguments made here. In particular, 
the focus on the market for inventions (as opposed to 
technology) can be seen as a direct application of those ideas. 
Objections to markets in technology by Arrow and Samuelson 
can be seen as information cost arguments—that such 
arbitrary bundles of technological information do not easily fit 
as modules within the existing price system.196 In contrast, 
inventions are special modules that can fit. In particular, this 
modular fit can be seen as designing the patent system (and its 
market) to conform to and to leverage the institutional 
competence of neoclassical firms. The patent system constrains 
the patent-backed market to bundles of technological 
information that the neoclassical firm can both value and 
consume (i.e., utilize).  
A quick outline of the capabilities of the neoclassical 
firms makes this point explicit. Firms make business decisions 
based on production possibilities consisting of production plans. 
The firm’s engineers tell the business department of their 
technological capabilities—their technical ability “to transform 
arrays of commodities into different arrays.”197 This set of all 
feasible production plans is called a production possibility set.198 
  
 192 See Smith, supra note 112, at 1761; Merges, supra note 96, at 1480, 1514. 
 193 See Smith, supra note 112, at 1761-66; Carliss Y. Baldwin & Joachim 
Henkel, The Impact of Modularity on Intellectual Property and Value Appropriation 3-
5, 9 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-040, 2012), available at 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6894.html. 
 194 ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 99. 
 195 Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 
1702-08 (2012). 
 196 See id. at 1708-09 (describing the Lego-like fit of a well-designed module). 
 197 KREPS, supra note 166, at 234. 
 198 Id. at 234-39. 
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Armed with that information, the neoclassical firm aims 
to make the best business decision as to what production plan 
to actually implement. To determine the best production plan, 
the business department must estimate the demand for all 
possible outputs and then calculate the profit available for 
implementing a particular production plan. The goal for a 
profit-maximizing firm is, as the name implies, to pick the 
production plan that maximizes its profit.199 
Aiming to leverage modular design, the market for 
inventions is specifically designed to interface with those firms 
and their capabilities. In particular, inventions are defined 
such that those firms can place a value on them. Inventions in 
this regard can be thought of as particular production plans.200 
In essence, inventors approach these neoclassical firms and tell 
them about the utility of their invention; they tell the firms 
what their invention can do as a completed production plan. 
The firms then can redo their profit maximization calculation, 
now incorporating the one added production plan (i.e., the 
invention) into its production possibility set. The profit 
difference between these two calculations is the value of the 
invention to the firm. 
Importantly, the patent system is not then an isolated 
market separate from the regular price system. Rather, the 
patent system is designed to interface with the existing price 
system. It takes the neoclassical firms and then builds a 
market with inventions for those firms. Buying and selling 
inventions becomes an endogenous extension of the existing 
neoclassical model. Neoclassical firms can, for a licensing fee, 
receive the invention from the inventor and thereby expand 
their production possibilities. In a sense, technological growth 
(and the direction of technological growth) becomes an 
endogenous result of these specialized invention-producing 
firms interacting with the invention-consuming firms via the 
invention market.201 
  
 199 See id. at 239-53. 
 200 More precisely, each particular embodiment that makes up an invention is 
a particular production plan. 
 201 See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
S71, S71 (1990). 
1372 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
5. Research Plans & Abstract Ideas Are Not Yet 
Inventions 
Along with defining the types of technological advances 
the system aims to make into marketable commodities, this 
market narrative also suggests the types of advances that 
cannot be easily commodified. As to his criticisms, Arrow noted 
that among all the types of information, “basic research, the 
output of which is only used as an informational input into 
other inventive activities, is especially unlikely to be rewarded 
[in a market].”202 Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that basic scientific discoveries are not patentable subject 
matter.203 This boundary of patentability coincides with the 
market narrative, and such basic discoveries are too hard to 
value and pose serious tractability problems for enforceable 
property rights.  
Furthermore, patentable subject matter does not extend 
to “abstract ideas,” though the patent bar has been at a loss to 
articulate the exact contours of abstract ideas.204 The market-
based narrative gives some hints as to the proper definition of 
abstract ideas. Often, en route toward creating an invention, 
inventors do develop technological advances and information 
that are useful for ultimately creating a workable production 
plan (i.e., an invention). This intermediate information is 
surely, in a sense, useful, yet these intermediate results should 
not be patentable—they are not yet inventions. Though 
important, these intermediate steps are too hard to price 
because it is too difficult to later separate out the relative 
contributions that produced the actual invention. Without 
knowing the ultimate inventions that will flow from the 
intermediate result, the valuation of those intermediate results 
remains highly uncertain. For example, bridges are certainly 
useful human creations, and by comparing the bridge crossing 
to alternative routes, we could hopefully judge the utility and 
value of the bridge. Now imagine an unfinished bridge 
spanning three quarters of your favorite body of water like the 
San Francisco Bay or the Hudson River.205 How much will you 
pay for the right to use that bridge? Certainly it is useful—it 
  
 202 Arrow, supra note 26, at 618. 
 203 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).  
 204 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). 
 205 See Lee Anne Fennel, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956 
(2012) (opening her discussion with the image of a partially completed bridge). 
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gets you most of the way across—yet valuation has become 
much harder. For this reason, advances that are not completed 
inventions, but are still just “research plans” or “abstract 
ideas,” do not receive patent protection.206 They are not 
appropriate for this market and its special needs.  
Scientific discoveries and incomplete technological 
advances (abstract ideas) also suffer from traceability 
problems. It is difficult to detect and police unauthorized use of 
these types of information. In this regard, the existing patent 
statute, which explicitly grants protection to inventions only, 
takes advantage of modularity. Only specific packages of 
information couple and properly fit with the existing price 
system, and only those packages are recognized by the patent 
system. 
6. Connections to Existing Scholarship 
This new patent narrative emphasizes a number of 
features of the patent system, many of which have been the 
subject of independent calls for reform. Inventions are the 
specific solution to some technical problem that has been 
conceived by its creator—the inventor. To qualify as an 
invention, the solution must be refined enough that it works for 
its intended purpose—i.e., it actually solves the problem it aims 
to solve—and that it can be described in enough detail so that 
without additional information, “any” person of skill in that 
technological area can practice it.207 It requires that little tacit 
  
 206 See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1356-57 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). Though Ariad is most often seen as a disclosure case, there is an alternate 
interpretation. The patentee in Ariad had indeed created a technological advance 
noting that disruption of the NF-kB pathway would likely reduce the harmful side 
effects of the inflammation caused by the pathway. That information may be useful but 
it had not yet matured to become an invention. Their advance had not matured to the 
level of completion and specificity to become a market commodity. Note there has 
always been a curious, relatively unexplored kinship between many § 101 and § 112 
cases. For that reason, I have grouped § 101 and § 112 together as the requirements 
based on the existence of an invention. See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 
32, at 23 (arguing for considering both § 101 and § 112 in concert where § 101 asks 
whether the patentee invented anything at all and § 112 ensures that the claims do not 
exceed the invention disclosed in the specification). 
 207 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). That definition takes advantage of modularity by 
ensuring the technological thing is developed to the point that it can be transported 
from one firm to the next. In fact, it must be ready to be deployed by “any” person of 
skill in the art. See ARORA ET AL., supra note 95, at 101 (describing the benefits to 
requiring “a better understanding of each other’s problems and needs, to share common 
objectives and beliefs, and to adopt a common language” (internal citation omitted)).  
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knowledge208 is necessary to practice the invention. By doing so, 
the patent system ensures that patentable inventions are ready 
to be commodified and widely (and easily) disseminated.209  
Recently, scholars have argued for such reforms. Both 
Christopher Cotropia and I have been advocating for a 
conceptual understanding of the invention as the actual 
technological “thing” the inventor creates.210 The current vision 
of the invention is not mainly as the technological “thing,” but 
solely as shorthand for the claimed subject matter. In my view, 
that conceptual void of the invention is tied to the incentive 
view. We both argue that a focus returning to the technological 
creation would not only keep the system true to its statutory and 
constitutional underpinnings, but also solve many of the current 
controversies in patent law. In a market for inventions narrative, 
the central focus is the substantive invention—i.e., the solution 
created by the invention that consumers will buy and use. 
In addition to patentable subject matter and the invention, 
the utility requirement plays an important gatekeeping role. For 
processes or tangible “things” like manufactures or machines, the 
utility derived from the invention determines the users’ valuation. 
Thus, the utility requirement demands a rather specific level of 
usefulness. Basic scientific discoveries certainly are highly 
useful (in fact they are often essential) for innovation, but, 
nonetheless, they should be excluded from patentability 
because their utility is neither specific nor can be agreed upon. 
For example, consider a chemical engineering firm that designs 
and builds petrochemical refineries. For them, Boyle’s law 
(defining an inverse relationship between pressure and volume 
of a gas) matters, but how much does it matter?211 How much 
should they pay for it? That is a hard question to answer and, 
again, that is why Arrow viewed the broad notion of a market 
for technology with skepticism. The utility requirement 
  
 208 See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 9-10 (1966) (explaining “the 
basic structure of tacit knowing”).  
 209 Cf. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, 
and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1523 
(2012) (describing difficulties in technology transfer in cases of basic and early applied 
research where significant tacit knowledge is still present therefore urging caution for 
patent protection for early stage and basic research). 
 210 See Cotropia, supra note 34, at 1855; Liivak, supra note 32, at 5. 
 211 See Glenn Research Ctr., Boyle’s Law, NASA, http://www.grc.nasa.gov/ 
WWW/k-12/airplane/boyle.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2011). 
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ensures that patentable inventions are only those technological 
“things” that have specific utility.212 
The Supreme Court made this point clear in Brenner v. 
Manson, in which it upheld the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals’ denial of patentability to a chemical process where the 
utility of the resulting product was still highly uncertain.213 The 
Court reasoned that patentability should not attach “[u]nless and 
until a process is refined and developed to th[e] point . . . where 
specific benefit exists in currently available form . . . .”214 The 
Court famously concluded, “a patent is not a hunting license. It is 
not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful 
conclusion.”215 From the perspective of a market for inventions, the 
utility requirement instructs innovators to continue to work and 
refine their work until it is substantially ready for any person of 
skill to use and value it.  
Others have already been calling for such reinvigoration 
of the utility requirement. In a pair of articles, Michael Risch 
has argued for a utility requirement that would extend to what 
he calls “commercial usefulness.”216 He reasoned “that a core 
benefit of the [utility] requirement is to aid in the 
commercialization of inventions” in order to “ensure that 
inventions are worth more to the public than they cost.”217 Such 
reforms, focusing on concepts like commercial utility, are in line 
with a patent system whose goal is to back a market in inventions. 
Lastly, there has been a long-standing debate over the 
proper timing of patent protection. Should patent protection 
attach early or late in the development of some technological 
advance? Ed Kitch’s “prospect” theory of patents asserts that 
early-stage patenting allows the inventor to mine the patent 
prospect more efficiently since it gives the inventor both central 
and exclusive control to coordinate the development and the 
commercialization of the invention.218 John Duffy recently 
added to these early-stage filing rationales by arguing that 
  
 212 Closely related to the above discussion of modularity, there is an emerging 
strand of property research exploring “lumpy” property. See Fennel, supra note 205, at 
1964. The patent system when seen through this market narrative appears to be a good 
example of that lumpiness.  
 213 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966). 
 214 Id. at 534-35. 
 215 Id. at 536. 
 216 See Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1204-
06 (2010) [hereinafter Risch, Reinventing Usefulness]; Michael Risch, A Surprisingly 
Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 67 (2011). 
 217 Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 216, at 1197, 1199. 
 218 Kitch, supra note 77, at 265, 276-79. 
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early filing had an overlooked, yet important, benefit: an 
earlier patent expiration and thus, an earlier entry into the 
public domain.219 
Pushing in the other direction, scholars such as 
Christopher Cotropia and Ted Sichelman have argued that 
early filing alone is a mistake.220 According to Cotropia, “early 
filing forces inventors to make decisions and draft applications 
with little technical or market information about the 
invention.”221 He noted that “all inventors would be required to 
reduce their invention to practice before [filing] . . . .”222 His 
arguments are consistent with the market narrative that this 
article develops. Certainly the inventor must reduce the invention 
to practice. To be marketed to others, the invention needs to work 
for its intended purpose. And to overcome the objections by Arrow 
and Samuelson, it needs to be developed so that in negotiating 
exchange, there is enough technical and market information for 
both inventors and users to reach agreement. 
As is clear, the market narrative requires relatively 
clear technological and market information. As a result, 
reforms for later filings, where the patentee needs to have an 
invention (not just some technological idea), generally support 
a market in inventions. 
B. Exclusive Rights, Harm, and Remedies 
The second critical role for the patent system is to 
support the socially beneficial behavior of creating and 
disseminating inventions via exclusive rights. The system 
needs to recognize the third party actions that would harm or 
disrupt that socially beneficial behavior, and then define the 
exclusive rights of a patent in order to prohibit those harms. 
  
 219 John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 439, 469 (2004). 
 220 Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 74-75 (2010); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 341, 355-57 (2010) (arguing for a new additional type of narrow patent protection 
specifically aimed efforts to commercialize inventions). 
 221 Cotropia, supra note 220, at 69. 
 222 Id. at 71. Cotropia ultimately argues for a requirement that the invention 
be actually reduced to practice rather than constructively through filing the patent 
application (as is currently permitted). I would not go so far as to require actual 
reduction to practice. There is nothing wrong with constructive reduction to practice as 
long as we take it seriously. It is not meant to be a shortcut for inventors. Constructive 
reduction to practice, as any legal use of the word constructive, is a legal fiction where 
the technological advance has been refined to such a point that it could just as easily 
have been actually reduced to practice but for the sake of efficiency it was not. 
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This section will find that the inventor needs to prevent the 
unauthorized making, using, selling, offering to sell, and even 
importing the patented invention, which the current system 
grants as exclusive rights. Yet a system based on an exchange 
of inventions will diverge quite dramatically from the current 
system in regards to remedies. Remedies will no longer be seen 
as aiming to ensure that the artificial incentive of the patent 
reaches the patent holder. Instead, the aim of patent remedies 
will be to repair the actual harm done to the inventor’s 
dissemination plan; if a patent holder is not disseminating their 
invention, however, it is generally much harder to find any harm.  
1. Exclusive Rights and Correlative Duties to Refrain 
from Harm 
Having identified and selected the proper “thing”—the 
invention—for this market, the next question is what set of 
exclusive rights (if any) are needed. Rather than beginning 
that discussion with exclusive rights, it is better to first 
examine the Hohfeldian correlative duties—the duty of third 
parties to avoid causing harm to the market—that constitute 
the exclusive rights.223 In other words, the discussion above 
describes socially beneficial behavior and the actions that could 
interfere with that beneficial behavior.224 The discussion below 
reveals that those duties to prevent harm to the market may 
coincide nicely with the exclusive rights that the current patent 
statute grants.  
For the market to work properly, each consumer must 
signal their valuation of the invention based on their use. The 
following discusses the various ways this signaling function can 
be disrupted in descending order of seriousness. First, outright 
piracy of the invention is the most harmful act for the market. 
Imagine that the inventor discloses the invention to another, 
who then turns around and sells the invention him or herself. 
Each sale made by the pirate would be a lost valuation and if 
piracy were widespread, then such a market would not function. 
In other words, the rest of us should abide by a duty to abstain 
from selling inventions that are not our own.225 Accordingly, the 
  
 223 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 36-37 (1913). 
 224 See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 275, 278 (2008).  
 225 Note, however, that the issue of independent invention complicates this 
straightforward rule. See Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent 
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patent system should (and does) grant an exclusive right to the 
inventor to “sell” and “offer[] to sell” the invention.226 
Consider now someone who obtains an unauthorized 
copy of the invention from the inventor, but has no intention of 
selling or disseminating it to others. Rather, they just want to 
utilize the invention themselves. This is not as bad as outright 
piracy, but the usage is a lost signal from that one particular 
user. Again, if widespread, the market would not work properly 
and so, the patent system should accordingly grant an 
exclusive right “to use” the invention. 
Lastly, there may be instances where a third party 
intends to either sell or use the invention him or herself, and 
he or she makes the invention first. In order to stave off the 
harm from unauthorized sales or uses, it seems reasonable to 
pre-emptively grant an exclusive right “to make” the invention, 
but this case is less clear. For example, making the invention 
for purposes of testing it or understanding how it works (even 
by competitors) does not seem harmful immediately. This 
market narrative leaves significant room for a research-use 
exemption to the exclusive right to make and, to some degree, 
to use as well.227 
In addition to considering the acts that would cause 
harm, it is important to consider what particular “thing” would 
cause harm through its “making, using, or selling.” The harm 
comes from using or selling the inventor’s invention—the solution 
the inventor intends is to sell to others him or herself. The 
exclusive rights need not extend beyond the inventor’s actual 
invention; though this area is controversial, there are ample 
statutory arguments already establishing that the current patent 
statute could not extend exclusive rights beyond the invention.228 
That limitation coincides with the market narrative. 
With the exception of suggesting a reinvigorated 
research-use exception, the market for inventions narrative 
supports an array of exclusive rights quite similar to those 
granted by the current patent statute. But the narrative places 
those exclusive rights in a very different context. In particular, 
  
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1680-81 (2010). The implications of independent invention for 
this market-based model are left for future work. 
 226 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 227 See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1074-78 (1989) 
(recommending the creation of an experimental use exemption in patent law).  
 228 See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32, at 5; Liivak, Finding 
Invention, supra note 32, at 58-59. 
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the market narrative defines the rights under circumstances 
where market actors are directly harmed. The current 
incentive-based narrative, instead, views exclusion as the 
reward for having earned a patent: harm is not a central part 
of that story.229 
By constructing the normative theory of patent law 
around socially beneficial behavior and then predicating 
exclusion around preventing the third-party actions that harm 
that beneficial behavior, patent law can finally begin to 
integrate itself with other bodies of private law.230 There have 
been recent calls to introduce a concept of harm into patent 
law. Hovenkamp and Bohannon argue that “[a]n essential part 
of an infringement lawsuit should be proof of actual injury.”231 
This market narrative provides a way for patent law to develop 
this necessary notion of harm. 
2. Remedies 
So far in discussing patentability and exclusive rights, 
though there are have been differences in emphasis, the 
current patent system looks quite similar to the patent system 
necessary to support a market in inventions. The critical 
conceptual difference between this market narrative and the 
incentive narrative is the purpose of the patent system. In the 
incentive narrative, patents create incentives that would 
otherwise not exist; in the market narrative, the system aims to 
support and enable already existing incentives for transmission 
from invention consumers to the invention producers. As 
described above, that new purpose adds context to the 
discussion of exclusive rights. In the market narrative, 
exclusion is not granted just to transfer wealth; rather, it 
enables a beneficial exchange of inventions. That purpose is the 
ends for which the exclusion is (part of) the means. As a result, 
the means are tempered to serve (and not interfere with) those 
ends. That difference in purpose makes its most visible 
appearance in the discussion of remedies.  
The patent statute provides for two types of remedies: 
damages and injunctive relief. For damages, the court shall 
  
 229 HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 61 (“[T]he patent system 
lacks a serious harm requirement . . . .”).  
 230 See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56 (1995). But see 
Sichelman, supra note 66, at 2-4 (noting the disconnect between current patent theory 
and private law). 
 231 HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 15. 
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“award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for 
the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”232 Viewed 
from the incentive narrative, “damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement” has a relatively straightforward 
interpretation.233 Congress designed the system to provide a 
certain incentive to the patent holder and, through unauthorized 
infringement, the defendant has failed to contribute to that 
incentive. From this view, damages should aim to give the 
patent holder the incentive that Congress intended. Yet, owing 
directly to the intractable nature of the incentive narrative, 
nobody really knows what (from a policy perspective) that 
incentive should be. As a result, patent damages have been 
mired in real controversy. 
When viewed from the market narrative, a different 
interpretation emerges. As the purpose of the system is to 
provide for an institution where inventions can be exchanged, 
exclusion is aimed to prevent harm to that institution. 
Therefore, “damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement” should also look to the harm as a result of the 
defendant’s infringing actions.234 That view provides context for 
determinations of remedies that is far richer than the more 
absolutist incentive narrative. For example, a difference 
appears in the understanding of reasonable royalties provided 
by the statutory language—that damages are “in no event less 
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by 
the infringer . . . .”235  
Currently, interpretation of that provision requires 
consideration of multiple factors—the Georgia-Pacific factors—
identified by the case that first listed them.236 Among other 
factors, a reasonable royalty should consider  
the amount that a licensor . . . and a licensee . . . would have agreed 
upon . . . if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach 
an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent 
licensee . . . would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be 
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been 
acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.237 
  
 232 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 237 Id. 
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From the perspective of the incentive narrative, the Georgia-
Pacific factors analyze what the hypothetical license is for the 
exclusive rights controlled by the patent holder: how much 
would a patentee demand, knowing that the patent grants 
relatively absolute rights of exclusion? As with patent law’s 
more general damages calculation, the reasonable royalty 
calculation has been very imprecise, uncertain, and vaguely 
circular. In this formulation, a reasonable royalty is a license to 
make or use the “things” circumscribed by the exclusive rights, 
not a license for “the use made of the invention” as instructed 
by the statute.  
A different, more consistent view emerges when 
considered from the perspective of the market narrative. There, 
the minimum value of a “use made of the invention” makes 
much more sense since it can be literally interpreted. In the 
market narrative, some infringers can cause quite a bit of 
harm. Outright pirates can, for example, reduce revenue for 
the inventor to near zero. For such harmful acts, the patent 
statute rightfully should aim to determine how much the 
patentee would have made without the defendant’s piracy. The 
well-known alternate remedy of lost profits would be 
appropriate in those circumstances.  
Yet, others are not as harmful as pirates. Some are 
simply using the invention (and gaining its useful benefits) 
without paying for it. They are not further disseminating the 
invention. In that case, the patentee is just missing out on the 
licensing fee the user would have agreed to in order to use the 
invention. That missing revenue, which fits cleanly into the 
market narrative, is then seen as the purpose of the minimum 
damages provision and provides the proper remedy in the fact 
pattern described. There is no further consideration of an extra 
(monopoly derived) fee that the patentee could leverage based 
on her patent position because, in the market narrative, the 
patent system does not aim to necessarily grant such profits. 
The system only aims to enable inventors to reap revenues 
equal to the sum of the licensing fees from those that use the 
invention. Where a user slips through that licensing system, 
the patent system aims for the patentee to be able to capture 
that lost revenue.238 
  
 238 Treble damages do exist as a stick to force potential users of the invention 
into ex ante licensing with the patent holder. See 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
1382 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
Similar differences can be described for patent law’s 
injunctive relief that, by statute, are granted “in accordance 
with the principles of equity.”239 In the absolutist incentive 
narrative, injunctive relief would be common and rather 
independent of both the patentee’s efforts to commercialize and 
the defendant’s actions.240 In contrast with the market 
narrative, injunctive relief would become far more contextual, 
depending on the harm that the defendant’s infringement was 
causing. In addition to depending on the defendant’s actions, 
the harm and injunctive relief would also depend on the patent 
holder’s actions as well. Efforts to disseminate the invention to 
those that can use it (the central mission of the system) would 
figure prominently in the equitable decision to grant and tailor 
injunctive relief.241 
In various guises, reforms resembling those suggested 
above have emerged in the literature, yet most of them suffer 
from still being tied to the incentive narrative. For example, 
many have been calling for a notion of harm in patent law. 
Cotter and Blair suggested as much ten years ago.242 Lee Anne 
Landers similarly looks for such notion, and Bohannon and 
Hovenkamp spend a great deal of their recent book arguing for 
a concept of harm.243 
Though that direction is certainly in line with the 
argument here, the continued shadow of the incentive 
narrative has limited those suggestions. For example, Landers 
focuses on remedies and argues for “the fundamental premise 
that a patentee’s harm cannot be greater than the patentee’s 
contribution.”244 Lemley and Shapiro further argue, “patent 
royalties [should] bear some reasonable relationship to what 
patentees actually contributed.”245  
Though I agree with much of that work, it does not go 
far enough to define its terms. The trouble is that 
“contribution” is far too vague a concept to really reform 
remedies. Does the contribution include market information 
developed by the patentee, other inventions that were inspired 
  
 239 Id. § 283. 
 240 See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423-27 (1908). 
 241 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395-97 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the rise of patent trolls should impact the 
equitable factors relevant for the grant of a permanent injunction).  
 242 Blair & Cotter, supra note 52, at 48-49. 
 243 See generally HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79. 
 244 Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and 
Sequential Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 471-72 (2012). 
 245 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2044. 
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by the patentee, or other assorted technological information 
that is developed as a consequence of developing the invention? 
Because it does not answer these types of questions, 
contribution remains too ill defined. As made clear above, the 
invention is a more specific, manageable concept by which to 
judge remedies. Indeed, Lemley and Shapiro implicitly define 
their notion of contribution along lines that are similar to the 
notion of the invention developed here. Their discussion of 
remedies “develop[s] a benchmark level for the royalty rate, 
i.e., the royalty rate that would be reasonable and expected in 
the ideal patent system without any element of holdup.”246After 
developing that notion of a baseline, Lemley and Shapiro then 
go on to show that patent licensing revenue can exceed that 
baseline since patentees leverage their “holdup power” (or as I 
describe, the naked exclusion of the patent).247 
Perhaps not surprisingly, their proposal ran headlong 
into criticism, which came from a straightforward application 
of the incentive narrative.248 After all, as they describe, “[t]he 
Federal Circuit has concluded that this ‘additional leverage in 
licensing’ is ‘a natural consequence of the right to exclude and 
not an inappropriate reward’ to a patentee.”249 For instance, 
John Golden criticized Lemley and Shapiro’s “lack of a well-
justified baseline for determining whether royalties are 
‘excessive.’”250 According to Golden, they failed to show “that 
[their] specific royalty ‘benchmark,’ . . . represents the socially 
optimal level of patent-holder compensation.”251 “[T]hey do 
remarkably little to justify this use. How could they?”252 
Certainly within the framework of the incentive 
narrative, it is near impossible to prove that any level of 
protection provides the socially optimal level of protection, a 
difficulty Lemley and Shapiro admit.253 The point is that their 
baseline has come under fire largely because the idea of a 
baseline derived from the utility of the invention is just foreign. 
Yet exactly such a concept does emerge naturally from the 
market narrative.  
  
 246 Id. at 1999 (emphasis omitted).  
 247 See id. at 1999-2000. 
 248 Golden, supra note 41, at 2115. 
 249 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2010. 
 250 Golden, supra note 41,at 2115. 
 251 Id. at 2115-16 (footnote omitted). 
 252 Id. at 2137. 
 253 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 2166. 
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Of the recent discussions of remedies, Paul Heald’s work 
comes closest to the suggestions made in this article. Heald 
makes clear that his reforms are based, at least in part, on a 
transaction model of technological exchange. He highlights the 
problems with the incentive model, noting that they  
provide no help in calculating an upper-bound for patent remedies. 
Given that most current debates in patent law involve claims of 
overcompensation to patentees, the lack of means to measure 
whether damages are excessive is glaring. It is no surprise that the 
conventional incentive theory of patent law has proven to be of little 
use in resolving present debates over the scope of patent remedies.254 
As Heald lays out his arguments for reforming patent 
remedies, he focuses on the “gross value of the invention to the 
exploiting firm in terms of profits earned from additional sales 
or manufacturing costs saved . . . .”255 Much of his sophisticated 
analysis of remedies in the transactional context can be 
employed to structure remedies in the market narrative 
presented here.  
3. Patent Duration 
In the incentive narrative, patent duration has long 
been seen as one of the central policy levers that can modulate 
the patent incentive. For example, economists have employed 
sophisticated models to justify the patent term from within 
that incentive narrative.256 Though the exact length of the 
patent term is contested, there is consensus that the patent 
term should not be infinite (constitutionally, it cannot be257) and 
likely should be shorter than the copyright term. As with the 
rest of the patent incentive narrative, the patent term is seen 
as giving a rough estimate of the necessary incentive to 
optimize innovation. 
Yet in the market-based narrative advocated for here, 
there is no attempt to dial-in the right amount of artificial 
incentives since the purpose of the system is the mutually 
beneficial exchange of inventions. With that narrative, how 
long should society protect that exchange? As it is more squarely 
designed as a natural extension of private property, does this 
narrative suggest an infinite patent term? After all, if revenue 
  
 254 Heald, Optimal Remedies, supra note 105, at 1173 (footnote omitted). 
 255 Id. at 1176-77 (emphasis omitted). 
 256 NORDHAUS, supra note 183, at 76-90. 
 257 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8. 
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(from sales of the invention derived a few years after filing the 
patent) should go to the inventor, why shouldn’t revenue derived 
fifty years from filing go as well? What patent term is demanded 
by the market narrative? How long should patents last?  
This section gives what appears as an initially smug 
answer: the patent term should last long enough, but need not 
be unnecessarily long. That statement can be given workable 
form by considering the idea of the “effective patent life.”258 
Independent of the actual patent term, effective patent life 
describes the time the invention is created until the underlying 
invention is no longer demanded by consumers—e.g., where the 
invention is overtaken by newer, better developments.259 As 
long as the actual patent term is longer than the effective 
patent life, all the relevant revenue is directed to the patent 
holder; it is presumed to go to zero afterwards for the rest of 
the patent term. This supports the policy rationale that the 
patent term needs to be long enough—i.e., it needs to be longer 
that the effective patent life in most industries—and there is 
some evidence that this is less than the twenty-year patent 
term in some cases.260  
With the argument that the actual patent term should 
be greater than the effective invention life, why isn’t the easiest 
resolution (aside from constitutional issues) to just set the 
patent term to infinity? We would then be assured that the 
actual patent term exceeds the effective patent life. The short 
answer is that such an infinite term is not necessary to 
substantially achieve the purpose of the system. The system is 
designed to allocate today’s scarce resources toward the 
creation and dissemination of tomorrow’s inventions. The 
success of that system relies upon the business judgment of 
entrepreneurial inventors. They are the ones making the 
judgment (and taking the associated risks) that balance today’s 
opportunity costs of the scarce resources against the aggregate 
revenue they could receive during the patent term from 
licensing the invention. As the patent term is extended, more 
inventive projects are becoming feasible, but the marginal 
incentive of each additional year decreases exponentially. 
  
 258 Ted O’Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of 
Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 2-5 (1998). 
 259 Id.  
 260 Id. at 2. 
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Justice Breyer’s dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft cited economists 
making just this point in an amicus brief.261  
Though some might quibble with discount rates, a 
twenty-year patent term captures approximately seventy-five 
percent of the discounted present value of an infinite patent 
term assuming constant demand for the invention.262 Note that 
this last assumption is highly contested and likely far too 
generous; as suggested above, inventions may well have 
effective patent terms where demand drops often quite 
dramatically during the patent term.263 With Moore’s Law 
impacting many areas of computing, doubling many relevant 
performance metrics every eighteen months,264 demand for 
inventions surely drops radically during the twenty-year 
term.265 The result is that a twenty-year patent term likely is 
long enough for inventors to recoup the costs of their 
investments in many cases. That being said, this new narrative 
does open the door to a different exploration of the patent term, 
apart from (and no longer constrained by) the incentive 
narrative.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
A. Unified Patent Law and Industry-Specific Innovation 
As described above, one result of this new patent 
narrative is that the scope of patent exclusion should not 
extend beyond the invention created and disclosed by the 
inventor. As I have argued elsewhere, there are good doctrinal 
and policy reasons to adopt this unified limitation for all 
patentees.266 There is one facet of this unified argument, 
however, that appears troubling at first. 
  
 261 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254-55 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 262 See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 5-7, Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186 (No. 01-618) (making their calculations with 
a seven percent discount rate). 
 263 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 267-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[U]ncontested data 
indicate that no author could rationally expect that a stream of copyright royalties will 
be constant forever.”). 
 264 See Nathan Myhrvold, Moore’s Law Corollary: Pixel Power, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 7, 2006, at G3. 
 265 If Moore’s law holds across a twenty year period and doubles every 18 
months, the relevant performance metric has increased by a factor of about 10,000 
during twenty years. How much would you pay for a computer that is 10,000 slower 
than your current computer?  
 266 See Liivak, Rescuing the Invention, supra note 32, at 5; Liivak, Finding 
Invention, supra note 32, at 50-52. 
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During the course of the past decade,267 Dan Burk and 
Mark Lemley authored a series of articles arguing that 
innovation varies by industry and that, though it is a daunting 
task, patent law should take these industry differences into 
account.268 Their work culminated in a book, which principally 
argues that,  
[A] purely unitary patent system no longer fits the extraordinarily 
diverse needs of innovators in today’s technology industries . . . [and] 
that the solution is not to split the patent system into industry-
specific protection statutes, but to tailor the unitary patent rules on 
a case-by-case basis to the needs of different industries . . . .269 
There are two components of their arguments. First, as a 
positive matter, they observe that different technology 
industries have different risk, cost, and revenue profiles.270 
Second, taking the incentive narrative for patents as a given, 
those differences should be accounted for by the incentives 
granted by an optimized patent system.271 As a corollary, any 
strictly uniform patent system must under- and over-
incentivize some industries.272 To a large extent, their views 
have gained traction. There is agreement that the “‘factually 
right answer[s]’ to problematic questions about the duration 
and scope of IP rights . . . are very complex and may vary 
considerably from one industry to the next.”273 
So how does the unified patent system (and, in 
particular, the unified patent exclusion) developed here deal 
with these industry-specific differences? At a high level of 
generality, the short answer is that it doesn’t deal with the 
issue directly. More precisely, the patent system developed 
here doesn’t need to deal with it directly—that is an important 
strength of a system not aiming to calibrate incentives itself; 
rather, it polices and channels behavior.  
The patent institution developed here should be seen as 
a socially beneficial, fairly universal tool that can be utilized by 
innovative businesses. The purpose of the institution and its 
underlying rules should be well publicized, and if a firm can 
  
 267 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at vii. 
 268 See id. at 38. 
 269 Id. at 5. 
 270 See id. at 38. 
 271 See id. at 66. 
 272 SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 117 (noting the “defect . . . aris[ing] from the 
‘onesize fits all’ [IP system] . . . [i]t is almost inevitable that some classes of innovations 
are under rewarded and others are overrewarded relative to the costs of invention.”). 
 273 HOVENKAMP & BOHANNON, supra note 79, at 47. 
1388 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
beneficially utilize the institution, then they will use it—i.e., 
the firms themselves are in the best position to judge the needs 
and frailties of their business models. Patent law provides one 
of many tools they can turn to and layer in order to structure 
that business. In short, patent law writ large need not be 
industry specific, but as differing firms will differ in the way 
and amount that they rely on the system, the net effect will 
address those differing requirements. For example, despite the 
very divergent needs of an apartment-building developer in 
Manhattan and a rancher in Montana, both can utilize fairly 
uniform property laws even though they are using the tool of 
property to support very different businesses.  
Furthermore, though the overall structure of property is 
the same in Montana and Manhattan, it is the institution that 
can quite effectively account for their contextual differences, 
primarily in regards to harms and remedies. Here, in the 
domain of remedies, courts can deploy contextual differences 
and their own experience of best business practices in other 
market arenas, in order to help tailor concepts (like patent 
harm and patent remedies) that reflect industrial and 
contextual differences in markets for inventions.  
B. Further Research  
Though the above section outlined both the economic 
justification for a market in inventions and the exclusive rights 
and remedies necessary for that system, there are many 
detailed economic and legal issues that still need to be 
explored. Real questions remain as to the impact of price 
discrimination on the analysis, the impact and role of 
independent inventors, the role of compulsory licensing, and 
the relationship between optimality and spillovers. Answers to 
these significant questions will surely help shed light on the 
strengths and weaknesses of this proposed view and purpose of 
the patent system.  
CONCLUSION 
This article has established that private decision-
making alone (without the influence of artificial incentives) can 
align with society’s interest in allocating resources toward 
creating inventions. In other words, a simple market exchange 
for disseminating inventions is socially justified. Importantly, 
the justification does not extend broadly to a market in 
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technology generally, but rather only to a market in inventions. 
Inventions are special technological “things” that, in contrast to 
other technological information, can be valued and negotiated 
by neoclassical firms. With that narrowed focus, the article 
established the social benefits created by the voluntary 
exchange of inventions. In this narrative, the patent system 
leverages a modular design, which enables it to interface with 
neoclassical firms through the price system and, thereby, also 
allows the system’s benefits to be quantified and ultimately 
justified. 
Though not emphasized throughout, this narrative is 
not an exclusive one. It leaves room for others to either expand 
this narrative or to form some other alternative in order to 
justify another aspect of patent ecosystem. This market 
narrative supports parts of the existing patent system, while it 
does not explicitly remove support for other areas—the existing 
incentive narrative with all its faults and ambiguities still is 
there. But in effect, if it can develop a consensus behind it, this 
new market narrative will implicitly force out these intractable 
narratives. As for behavior, like patent trolling, that is outside 
the justification of the market narrative, proponents of trolling 
will need to develop their own convincing case for troll 
behavior—I doubt such a case can be made. 
Furthermore, even as to the market narrative itself, this 
is not the end of the story; rather, it is just the beginning. This 
brief introduction to the market narrative leaves many 
important and interesting questions for future research. 
Though only scratching the surface, the hope is that this article 
establishes that certain specific acts—namely creating and 
disseminating an invention—can be economically justified. The 
patent system may be necessary to protect those activities. By 
developing a patent narrative with these more familiar market 
oriented economic arguments, it is hoped that new doors are 
opened for a more thorough economic exploration and 
refinement of the patent system. And if we’re lucky, that might 
lead to consensus and acceptance. 
